GHSA-9FVJ-XQR2-XWG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-29 20:20 – Updated: 2025-09-01 20:05
VLAI
Summary
gnark affected by denial of service when computing scalar multiplication using fake-GLV algorithm
Details

Impact

For optimizing the scalar multiplication algorithm in circuit for some curves, gnark uses fake-GLV algorithm in case the curve doesn't support true-GLV. For this to work, we need to compute the scalar decomposition using the Half GCD method in gnark-crypto. However, for some of the inputs the algorithm didn't converge quickly enough.

In case the prover accepts untrusted witness, it could lead to denial of service as the prover gets stuck in a very slowly converging loop.

Thanks to @feltroidprime for reporting the issue and proposing a fix.

Patches

The issue has been patched in gnark-crypto commit https://github.com/Consensys/gnark-crypto/commit/56600883e0e9f9b159e9c7000b94e76185ec3d0d. The dependency update is implemented in gnark commit https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/68be6cede36e387ab760725beabd3c96cc94e6dc.

Workarounds

This update doesn't require recompiling the circuits as the issue is in the hint function. The users can update the gnark-crypto dependency to the fixed version.

References

  • See bug report https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/issues/1483
  • Fake GLV description https://ethresear.ch/t/fake-glv-you-dont-need-an-efficient-endomorphism-to-implement-glv-like-scalar-multiplication-in-snark-circuits/20394
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/consensys/gnark"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.12.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58157"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-29T20:20:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-29T22:15:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nFor optimizing the scalar multiplication algorithm in circuit for some curves, gnark uses fake-GLV algorithm in case the curve doesn\u0027t support true-GLV. For this to work, we need to compute the scalar decomposition using the Half GCD method in gnark-crypto. However, for some of the inputs the algorithm didn\u0027t converge quickly enough.\n\nIn case the prover accepts untrusted witness, it could lead to denial of service as the prover gets stuck in a very slowly converging loop.\n\nThanks to @feltroidprime for reporting the issue and proposing a fix.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in gnark-crypto commit https://github.com/Consensys/gnark-crypto/commit/56600883e0e9f9b159e9c7000b94e76185ec3d0d. The dependency update is implemented in gnark commit https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/68be6cede36e387ab760725beabd3c96cc94e6dc.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThis update doesn\u0027t require recompiling the circuits as the issue is in the hint function. The users can update the gnark-crypto dependency to the fixed version.\n\n### References\n\n* See bug report https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/issues/1483\n* Fake GLV description https://ethresear.ch/t/fake-glv-you-dont-need-an-efficient-endomorphism-to-implement-glv-like-scalar-multiplication-in-snark-circuits/20394",
  "id": "GHSA-9fvj-xqr2-xwg8",
  "modified": "2025-09-01T20:05:35Z",
  "published": "2025-08-29T20:20:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/security/advisories/GHSA-9fvj-xqr2-xwg8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/issues/1483"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark-crypto/commit/56600883e0e9f9b159e9c7000b94e76185ec3d0d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/68be6cede36e387ab760725beabd3c96cc94e6dc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Consensys/gnark"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "gnark affected by denial of service when computing scalar multiplication using fake-GLV algorithm"
}



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