GHSA-9FF2-P842-45WQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 20:54 – Updated: 2026-10-09 20:54
VLAI
Summary
Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions
Details

RequestTokenListener is the only generic REQUEST_TOKEN validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an act parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.

Impact

An attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future key= action inherits it.

Honest bound. The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a key= action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "contao/core-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.3.50"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "contao/core-bundle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.4.0-RC1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.7.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107848"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T20:54:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "`RequestTokenListener` is the only generic `REQUEST_TOKEN` validator in Contao and it only runs on POST. On the GET side the guard is local and declarative, and it only fires when an `act` parameter is present. Every back end action dispatched through a different parameter therefore has no CSRF protection at all. This is a family rather than a single bug.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who gets a logged in back end user to load a URL performs back end actions as that user, with no token and no confirmation. Because the exposure follows from the dispatch mechanism rather than from one callback, every present and future `key=` action inherits it.\n\n**Honest bound.** The victim must be authenticated in the back end and must load the URL, and the reachable actions are limited to the modules that user can access. We have not found a `key=` action that grants privileges; the ones we verified are destructive or state changing rather than escalating.",
  "id": "GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T20:54:00Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T20:54:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/security/advisories/GHSA-9ff2-p842-45wq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/commit/34dd27ee6739f10568d3d95d8784862255c925b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/contao/contao"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/contao/contao/releases/tag/5.7.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Contao: Cross-site request forgery in custom backend actions"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.