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GHSA-9F29-V6MM-PW6W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 15:25 – Updated: 2026-02-19 21:56
VLAI
Summary
opa-envoy-plugin has an Authorization Bypass via Double-Slash Path Misinterpretation in input.parsed_path
Details

A security vulnerability has been discovered in how the input.parsed_path field is constructed. HTTP request paths are treated as full URIs when parsed; interpreting leading path segments prefixed with double slashes (//) as authority components, and therefore dropping them from the parsed path. This creates a path interpretation mismatch between authorization policies and backend servers, enabling attackers to bypass access controls by crafting requests where the authorization filter evaluates a different path than the one ultimately served.

Attack example

HTTP request:

GET //admin/users HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com

Policy sees:

The leading //admin path segment is interpreted as an authority component, and dropped from input.parsed_path field:

{
  "parsed_path": ["users"]
}

Backend receives:

//admin/users path, normalized to /admin/users.

Affected Request Pattern Examples

Request path input.parsed_path input.attributes.request.http.path Discrepancy
/ [""] / ✅ None
//foo [""] //foo ❌ Mismatch
/admin ["admin"] /admin ✅ None
/admin/users ["admin", "users"] /admin/users ✅ None
//admin/users ["users"] //admin/users ❌ Mismatch

Impact

Users are impacted if all the following conditions apply:

  1. Protected resources are path-hierarchical (e.g., /admin/users vs /users)
  2. Authorization policies use input.parsed_path for path-based decisions
  3. Backend servers apply lenient path normalization

Patches

Go: v1.13.2-envoy-2 Docker: 1.13.2-envoy-2, 1.13.2-envoy-2-static

Workarounds

Users who cannot immediately upgrade opa-envoy-plugin are recommended to apply one, or more, of the workarrounds described below.

1. Enable the merge_slashes Envoy configuration option

As per Envoy best practices, enabling the merge_slashes configuration option in Envoy will remove redundant slashes from the request path before filtering is applied, effectively mitigating the input.parsed_path issue described in this advisory.

2. Use input.attributes.request.http.path instead of input.parsed_path in policies

The input.attributes.request.http.path field contains the unprocessed, raw request path. Users are recommended to update any policy using input.parsed_path to instead use the input.attributes.request.http.path field.

Example
package example

# Use instead of input.parsed_path
parsed_path := split(                                        # tokenize into array
    trim_left(                                               # drop leading slashes
        urlquery.decode(input.attributes.request.http.path), # url-decode the path
        "/",
    ),
    "/",
)
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.13.1-envoy"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.2-envoy-2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26205"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T15:25:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T20:25:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A security vulnerability has been discovered in how the `input.parsed_path` field is constructed. HTTP request paths are treated as full URIs when parsed; interpreting leading path segments prefixed with double slashes (`//`) as [authority](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2) components, and therefore dropping them from the parsed path. This creates a path interpretation mismatch between authorization policies and backend servers, enabling attackers to bypass access controls by crafting requests where the authorization filter evaluates a different path than the one ultimately served.\n\n#### Attack example\n\n**HTTP request:**\n\n```\nGET //admin/users HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com\n```\n\n**Policy sees:**\n\nThe leading `//admin` path segment is interpreted as an authority component, and dropped from `input.parsed_path` field:\n\n\n```json\n{\n  \"parsed_path\": [\"users\"]\n}\n```\n\n**Backend receives:**\n\n`//admin/users` path, normalized to `/admin/users`.\n\n#### Affected Request Pattern Examples\n\n| Request path | `input.parsed_path` | `input.attributes.request.http.path` | Discrepancy |\n| - | - | - | - |\n| / | [\"\"] | / | \u2705 None |\n| //foo  | [\"\"] | //foo| \u274c Mismatch |\n| /admin | [\"admin\"] | /admin | \u2705 None |\n| /admin/users | [\"admin\", \"users\"] |  /admin/users | \u2705 None |\n| //admin/users  | [\"users\"] | //admin/users | \u274c Mismatch |\n\n### Impact\n\nUsers are impacted if all the following conditions apply:\n\n1. Protected resources are path-hierarchical (e.g., `/admin/users` vs `/users`)\n2. Authorization policies use `input.parsed_path` for path-based decisions\n3. Backend servers apply lenient path normalization\n\n### Patches\n\nGo: `v1.13.2-envoy-2`\nDocker: `1.13.2-envoy-2`, `1.13.2-envoy-2-static`\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers who cannot immediately upgrade opa-envoy-plugin are recommended to apply one, or more, of the workarrounds described below.\n\n#### 1. Enable the `merge_slashes` Envoy configuration option\n\nAs per [Envoy best practices](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/v1.37.0/configuration/best_practices/edge.html), enabling the [merge_slashes](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/extensions/filters/network/http_connection_manager/v3/http_connection_manager.proto#envoy-v3-api-field-extensions-filters-network-http-connection-manager-v3-httpconnectionmanager-merge-slashes) configuration option in Envoy will remove redundant slashes from the request path before filtering is applied, effectively mitigating the `input.parsed_path` issue described in this advisory.\n\n\n#### 2. Use `input.attributes.request.http.path` instead of `input.parsed_path` in policies\n\nThe `input.attributes.request.http.path` field contains the unprocessed, raw request path. Users are recommended to update any policy using `input.parsed_path` to instead use the `input.attributes.request.http.path` field.\n\n##### Example ####\n\n```rego\npackage example\n\n# Use instead of input.parsed_path\nparsed_path := split(                                        # tokenize into array\n\ttrim_left(                                               # drop leading slashes\n\t\turlquery.decode(input.attributes.request.http.path), # url-decode the path\n\t\t\"/\",\n\t),\n\t\"/\",\n)\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-9f29-v6mm-pw6w",
  "modified": "2026-02-19T21:56:34Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T15:25:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin/security/advisories/GHSA-9f29-v6mm-pw6w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26205"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin/commit/58c44d4ec408d5852d1d0287599e7d5c5e2bc5c3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-policy-agent/opa-envoy-plugin/releases/tag/v1.13.2-envoy-2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "opa-envoy-plugin has an Authorization Bypass via Double-Slash Path Misinterpretation in input.parsed_path"
}



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