GHSA-9C38-2MCM-Q7F7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 19:01 – Updated: 2026-07-20 13:39Impact
An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could pollute the sandbox used by the Merge node's SQL Query mode. Because the sandbox context was cached and reused across all workflow executions on the instance, prototype mutations introduced by one user's workflow persist into subsequent Merge SQL executions belonging to other users or projects. This allowed a low-privileged attacker to intercept workflow data processed by other users on the same instance.
This issue only affects multi-user n8n instances where more than one user has permission to create and execute workflows containing the Merge node in SQL Query mode.
Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.25.7, and 2.26.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only.
- Disable the Merge node by adding n8n-nodes-base.merge to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.26.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.26.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "n8n"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.25.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54311"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-488"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T19:01:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T16:17:02Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\nAn authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could pollute the sandbox used by the Merge node\u0027s SQL Query mode. Because the sandbox context was cached and reused across all workflow executions on the instance, prototype mutations introduced by one user\u0027s workflow persist into subsequent Merge SQL executions belonging to other users or projects. This allowed a low-privileged attacker to intercept workflow data processed by other users on the same instance.\n\nThis issue only affects multi-user n8n instances where more than one user has permission to create and execute workflows containing the Merge node in SQL Query mode.\n\n## Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.25.7, and 2.26.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only.\n- Disable the Merge node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.merge` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
"id": "GHSA-9c38-2mcm-q7f7",
"modified": "2026-07-20T13:39:32Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T19:01:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-9c38-2mcm-q7f7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54311"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "n8n: Merge Node SQL Mode Prototype Pollution"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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