{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "surrealdb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T20:06:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was discovered where the user-supplied `WHERE` clause in a `SELECT` statement is evaluated against the full record data before `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` determines whether the principal is authorised to access that record. A side-effecting expression in the `WHERE` clause can exfiltrate record contents before the permission check runs. The same ordering bug affects the `SET`, `MERGE`, `CONTENT` and `PATCH` clauses of update-variant statements (`UPDATE`, `UPSERT-update`, `INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE`, `RELATE-update`).\n\nThis vulnerability is confined to the attacker\u0027s current database. It does not cross namespace or database isolation boundaries.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn authenticated user \u2014 including Record and Scope users \u2014 can read the full contents of any table in the database they are authenticated against, bypassing `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` restrictions on those tables.\n\nThe most direct exfiltration method requires scripting functions to be enabled (`--allow-scripting` / `-A`). However, exfiltration via SurrealQL\u0027s `THROW` statement is also feasible without scripting functions, and timing-based side-channel extraction is possible in all configurations.\n\nAll tables within the attacker\u0027s current database, regardless of table-level `PERMISSIONS FOR SELECT WHERE` restrictions on those tables, are vulnerable to this attack. Tables in other databases within the same namespace, or within other namespaces, are not vulnerable.\n\n### Patches\n\nA patch has been introduced that runs `check_permissions_table` before any user-supplied expression is evaluated against the record. A new `check_pre_update` helper centralises this ordering on every update-variant code path. Regression tests covering `WHERE`, `SET`, `MERGE`, `CONTENT`, `INSERT ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE`, and `RELATE` with `THROW` side-effects are included.\n\n- Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAffected users who are unable to update may want to:\n\n- **Disable scripting functions** if not required \u2014 remove the `-A` / `--allow-scripting` flag. This blocks the most direct exfiltration method but does not fully mitigate the vulnerability, as `THROW`-based and timing-based exfiltration remain possible.\n- **Limit query access** \u2014 restrict the ability of untrusted principals to run arbitrary `SELECT` queries with user-controlled `WHERE` clauses.\n- **Use namespace/database isolation** instead of table-level permissions as the primary security boundary where feasible, since the vulnerability is in table-level permission enforcement, not namespace or database isolation.",
  "id": "GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T20:06:08Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T20:06:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-98fx-66cf-fc7c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/commit/500f4060349580b9cbb9c07b8112a487551c4616"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SurrealDB: Scraping a TABLE with no available PERMISSIONS to current auth level"
}