GHSA-96X7-QG22-QW59

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 12:30 – Updated: 2026-01-11 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: ath11k: fix peer HE MCS assignment

In ath11k_wmi_send_peer_assoc_cmd(), peer's transmit MCS is sent to firmware as receive MCS while peer's receive MCS sent as transmit MCS, which goes against firmwire's definition.

While connecting to a misbehaved AP that advertises 0xffff (meaning not supported) for 160 MHz transmit MCS map, firmware crashes due to 0xffff is assigned to he_mcs->rx_mcs_set field.

Ext Tag: HE Capabilities
    [...]
    Supported HE-MCS and NSS Set
    [...]
        Rx and Tx MCS Maps 160 MHz
        [...]
            Tx HE-MCS Map 160 MHz: 0xffff

Swap the assignment to fix this issue.

As the HE rate control mask is meant to limit our own transmit MCS, it needs to go via he_mcs->rx_mcs_set field. With the aforementioned swapping done, change is needed as well to apply it to the peer's receive MCS.

Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.1 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.41 Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-68380"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-24T11:16:01Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: ath11k: fix peer HE MCS assignment\n\nIn ath11k_wmi_send_peer_assoc_cmd(), peer\u0027s transmit MCS is sent to\nfirmware as receive MCS while peer\u0027s receive MCS sent as transmit MCS,\nwhich goes against firmwire\u0027s definition.\n\nWhile connecting to a misbehaved AP that advertises 0xffff (meaning not\nsupported) for 160 MHz transmit MCS map, firmware crashes due to 0xffff\nis assigned to he_mcs-\u003erx_mcs_set field.\n\n\tExt Tag: HE Capabilities\n\t    [...]\n\t    Supported HE-MCS and NSS Set\n\t\t[...]\n\t        Rx and Tx MCS Maps 160 MHz\n\t\t    [...]\n\t            Tx HE-MCS Map 160 MHz: 0xffff\n\nSwap the assignment to fix this issue.\n\nAs the HE rate control mask is meant to limit our own transmit MCS, it\nneeds to go via he_mcs-\u003erx_mcs_set field. With the aforementioned swapping\ndone, change is needed as well to apply it to the peer\u0027s receive MCS.\n\nTested-on: WCN6855 hw2.1 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.41\nTested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1",
  "id": "GHSA-96x7-qg22-qw59",
  "modified": "2026-01-11T18:30:29Z",
  "published": "2025-12-24T12:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/097c870b91817779e5a312c6539099a884b1fe2b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/381096a417b7019896e93e86f4c585c592bf98e2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4304bd7a334e981f189b9973056a58f84cc2b482"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a013ca2d490c73c40588d62712ffaa432046a04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b1a0da75932353f66e710976ca85a7131f647ff"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/92791290e4f6a1de25d35af792ab8918a70737f6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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