GHSA-9644-Q9WF-WC94

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb/server: prevent file publication after tree disconnect

TREE_DISCONNECT closes the tree's published file handles before marking and removing the tree connection. A concurrent CREATE that already holds a tree reference can therefore publish its file after the close pass. When CREATE drops its reference, the tree can be freed while the published file still points to it.

Mark and remove the tree connection before closing its files, and serialize both new-open and durable-reconnect volatile ID publication with that state transition. An opener is then either published in time for the close pass or rejected after disconnect with STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED.

Keep a tree reference while a file carries its tree pointer. This protects asynchronous users that can defer the file's final destruction past tree disconnect.

The close pass can race the successful FP_NEW to FP_INITED transition. Take the opening request's file reference atomically with that transition. This keeps the file alive until request completion even if teardown removes the ID immediately.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_show_files (fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c:126) Read of size 4 at addr ff11000101540f80 by task poc/153

Call Trace: proc_show_files (fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c:126) seq_read_iter (fs/seq_file.c:231) proc_reg_read_iter (fs/proc/inode.c:299) vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:574) ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

Allocated by: ksmbd_tree_conn_connect (fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c:35) smb2_tree_connect (fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:2819) handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:368)

Freed by: kfree (mm/slub.c:6801) handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:332)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99792"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:18Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb/server: prevent file publication after tree disconnect\n\nTREE_DISCONNECT closes the tree\u0027s published file handles before marking and\nremoving the tree connection. A concurrent CREATE that already holds a tree\nreference can therefore publish its file after the close pass. When CREATE\ndrops its reference, the tree can be freed while the published file still\npoints to it.\n\nMark and remove the tree connection before closing its files, and serialize\nboth new-open and durable-reconnect volatile ID publication with that state\ntransition. An opener is then either published in time for the close pass\nor rejected after disconnect with STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED.\n\nKeep a tree reference while a file carries its tree pointer. This protects\nasynchronous users that can defer the file\u0027s final destruction past tree\ndisconnect.\n\nThe close pass can race the successful FP_NEW to FP_INITED transition.\nTake the opening request\u0027s file reference atomically with that transition.\nThis keeps the file alive until request completion even if teardown removes\nthe ID immediately.\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in proc_show_files (fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c:126)\n  Read of size 4 at addr ff11000101540f80 by task poc/153\n\n  Call Trace:\n    proc_show_files (fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c:126)\n    seq_read_iter (fs/seq_file.c:231)\n    proc_reg_read_iter (fs/proc/inode.c:299)\n    vfs_read (fs/read_write.c:574)\n    ksys_read (fs/read_write.c:716)\n    do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84)\n    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)\n\n  Allocated by:\n    ksmbd_tree_conn_connect (fs/smb/server/mgmt/tree_connect.c:35)\n    smb2_tree_connect (fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c:2819)\n    handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:368)\n\n  Freed by:\n    kfree (mm/slub.c:6801)\n    handle_ksmbd_work (fs/smb/server/server.c:332)",
  "id": "GHSA-9644-q9wf-wc94",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:11Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:32:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99792"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ff3730998b015b5b0a3f28330bee16c648dd114"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc5ac6813830eaf5b850e89d57403da1e1c50432"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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