GHSA-963H-3V39-3PQF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-27 18:00 – Updated: 2025-03-27 18:00
VLAI
Summary
Vega vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting via RegExp.prototype[@@replace]
Details

Impact

Users running Vega/Vega-lite JSON definitions could run unexpected JavaScript code when drawing graphs, unless the library is used with the vega-interpreter.

Workarounds

POC Summary

Calling replace with a RegExp-like pattern calls RegExp.prototype[@@replace], which can then call an attacker-controlled exec function.

POC Details

Consider the function call replace('foo', {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, global: false}). Since pattern has RegExp.prototype[@@replace], pattern.exec('foo') winds up being called.

The resulting malicious call looks like this:

replace(<string argument>, {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, exec: <function>, global: false})

Since functions cannot be returned from this, an attacker that wishes to escalate to XSS must abuse event.view to gain access to eval.

Reproduction steps

{"$schema":"https://vega.github.io/schema/vega/v5.json","signals":[{"name":"a","on":[{"events":"body:mousemove{99999}","update":"replace('alert(1)',{__proto__:/h/.constructor.prototype,exec:event.view.eval,global:false})"}]}]}
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vega"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.32.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "vega-functions"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27793"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79",
      "CWE-87"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-27T18:00:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-27T14:15:54Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nUsers running Vega/Vega-lite JSON definitions could run unexpected JavaScript code when drawing graphs, unless the library is used with the `vega-interpreter`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Use `vega` with [expression interpreter](https://vega.github.io/vega/usage/interpreter/)\n- Upgrade to a [newer Vega version](https://github.com/vega/vega/releases/tag/v5.32.0) (`5.32.0`)\n\n### POC Summary\n\nCalling `replace` with a `RegExp`-like pattern calls `RegExp.prototype[@@replace]`, which can then call an attacker-controlled `exec` function.\n\n### POC Details\n\nConsider the function call `replace(\u0027foo\u0027, {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, global: false})`. Since `pattern` has `RegExp.prototype[@@replace]`, `pattern.exec(\u0027foo\u0027)` winds up being called.\n\nThe resulting malicious call looks like this:\n```\nreplace(\u003cstring argument\u003e, {__proto__: /h/.constructor.prototype, exec: \u003cfunction\u003e, global: false})\n```\n\nSince functions cannot be returned from this, an attacker that wishes to escalate to XSS must abuse `event.view` to gain access to `eval`.\n\n### Reproduction steps\n\n```\n{\"$schema\":\"https://vega.github.io/schema/vega/v5.json\",\"signals\":[{\"name\":\"a\",\"on\":[{\"events\":\"body:mousemove{99999}\",\"update\":\"replace(\u0027alert(1)\u0027,{__proto__:/h/.constructor.prototype,exec:event.view.eval,global:false})\"}]}]}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-963h-3v39-3pqf",
  "modified": "2025-03-27T18:00:24Z",
  "published": "2025-03-27T18:00:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vega/vega/security/advisories/GHSA-963h-3v39-3pqf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27793"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vega/vega/commit/694560c0aa576df8b6c5f0f7d202ac82233e6966"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vega/vega"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vega/vega/releases/tag/v5.32.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vega.github.io/vega/usage/interpreter"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vega vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting via RegExp.prototype[@@replace]"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.