GHSA-95V5-2RXR-2QX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them
memstick_check() can pass its host->removing check just before rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then silently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject is set, and drv_remove's cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued handle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes card->mrq_complete.
Once memstick core waits for requests without a timeout ("memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card"), this hangs removal: memstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in flush_workqueue():
INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check __wait_for_common memstick_check
INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds. Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event __flush_workqueue memstick_remove_host rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove
Never drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req, and handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without touching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling it, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new request can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.
The host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves host->req NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do, and it would now race with handle_req.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99038"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:27Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmemstick: rtsx_usb_ms: complete requests after eject instead of dropping them\n\nmemstick_check() can pass its host-\u003eremoving check just before\nrtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove() sets eject/removing. Its next request is then\nsilently dropped: rtsx_usb_ms_request() skips schedule_work() once eject\nis set, and drv_remove\u0027s cancel_work_sync() can also cancel a queued\nhandle_req before it picks the request up. Nobody completes\ncard-\u003emrq_complete.\n\nOnce memstick core waits for requests without a timeout (\"memstick: core:\nwait for request completion before freeing card\"), this hangs removal:\nmemstick_check() never returns and memstick_remove_host() blocks in\nflush_workqueue():\n\n INFO: task kworker/u10:3:65 blocked for more than 20 seconds.\n Workqueue: kmemstick memstick_check\n __wait_for_common\n memstick_check\n\n INFO: task kworker/1:1:33 blocked for more than 20 seconds.\n Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event\n __flush_workqueue\n memstick_remove_host\n rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove\n\nNever drop a request. rtsx_usb_ms_request() always schedules handle_req,\nand handle_req fails requests with -ENOMEDIUM once eject is set, without\ntouching the device. drv_remove flushes handle_req instead of cancelling\nit, and cancels it only after memstick_remove_host(), when no new\nrequest can arrive, so it cannot run on a freed host.\n\nThe host_mutex drain in drv_remove is removed: handle_req always leaves\nhost-\u003ereq NULL when it finishes, so the drain never had anything to do,\nand it would now race with handle_req.",
"id": "GHSA-95v5-2rxr-2qx7",
"modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T15:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5616da0f92339328fa1472876df51555e15ad340"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b599e28aeb3684772aef64f46cc6f25f4c67128"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c96ca94425b076dc398d929366e378d1e22ec794"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7e811c3a49cd5cff529c157df886719e09370ec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2c181e1d58e911804e14543b2f1cc6b23a0d4d6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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