GHSA-946H-JP5C-8FVH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 19:34 – Updated: 2026-06-19 19:34
VLAI
Summary
symfony/ux-autocomplete: Information exposure via unescaped LIKE wildcards in EntitySearchUtil
Details

Description

Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause() builds the LIKE expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in %...% without escaping the SQL LIKE wildcards (%, _, \). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send % to match every row or use _ as a single-character wildcard.

Because searchable_fields defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (BaseEntityAutocompleteType ships with security => false), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose.

Resolution

EntitySearchUtil now escapes \, %, and _ in the user-supplied query with addcslashes() and appends an explicit ESCAPE '\' clause to the generated LIKE expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match words_query IN() branch is unchanged.

The patch for this issue is available here for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).

Credits

Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/ux-autocomplete"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.36.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "symfony/ux-autocomplete"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49211"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T19:34:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Description\n\n`Symfony\\UX\\Autocomplete\\Doctrine\\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard.\n\nBecause `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security =\u003e false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE \u0027\\\u0027` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged.\n\nThe patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a30007769214) for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).\n\n### Credits\n\nSymfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T19:34:53Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T19:34:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux/security/advisories/GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a30007769214"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/symfony/ux-autocomplete/CVE-2026-49211.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/symfony/ux"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "symfony/ux-autocomplete: Information exposure via unescaped LIKE wildcards in EntitySearchUtil"
}



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