GHSA-93XX-CVMC-9W3V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-09 19:58 – Updated: 2023-05-09 19:58Impact
If a malicious user gains control of a Kubernetes node running fluid csi pod (controlled by the csi-nodeplugin-fluid node-daemonset), he/she can leverage the fluid-csi service account to modify specs of all the nodes in the cluster. However, since this service account lacks "list node" permissions, the attacker may need to use other techniques to identify vulnerable nodes.
Once the attacker identifies and modifies the node specs, he/she can manipulate system-level-privileged components to access all secrets in the cluster or execute pods on other nodes. This allows he/she to elevate privileges beyond the compromised node and potentially gain full privileged access to the whole cluster.
To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker can make all other nodes unschedulable (for example, patch node with taints) and wait for system-critical components with high privilege to appear on the compromised node. However, this attack requires two prerequisites: a compromised node and identifying all vulnerable nodes through other means. Additionally, since the attack is passive and requires patience and luck, the severity of this finding is considered medium.
Patches
For users who're using version < 0.8.6, >= 0.7.0, upgrade to v0.8.6.
Workarounds
Delete the csi-nodeplugin-fluid daemonset in fluid-system namespace and avoid using CSI mode to mount FUSE file systems. Alternatively using sidecar mode to mount FUSE file systems is recommended. Refer to the doc to get a full example of how to use sidecar mode.
References
Fixed by Fix rbacs and limit CSI Plugin's node related access
Credits
Special thanks to the discoverers of this issue:
Nanzi Yang (nzyang@stu.xidian.edu.cn)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fluid-cloudnative/fluid"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-30840"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-09T19:58:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-08T18:15:14Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIf a malicious user gains control of a Kubernetes node running fluid csi pod (controlled by the `csi-nodeplugin-fluid` node-daemonset), he/she can leverage the fluid-csi service account to modify specs of all the nodes in the cluster. However, since this service account lacks \"list node\" permissions, the attacker may need to use other techniques to identify vulnerable nodes.\n\nOnce the attacker identifies and modifies the node specs, he/she can manipulate system-level-privileged components to access all secrets in the cluster or execute pods on other nodes. This allows he/she to elevate privileges beyond the compromised node and potentially gain full privileged access to the whole cluster.\n\nTo exploit this vulnerability, the attacker can make all other nodes unschedulable (for example, patch node with taints) and wait for system-critical components with high privilege to appear on the compromised node. However, this attack requires two prerequisites: a compromised node and identifying all vulnerable nodes through other means. Additionally, since the attack is passive and requires patience and luck, the severity of this finding is considered medium.\n\n### Patches\nFor users who\u0027re using version \u003c 0.8.6, \u003e= 0.7.0, upgrade to v0.8.6.\n\n### Workarounds\nDelete the `csi-nodeplugin-fluid` daemonset in `fluid-system` namespace and avoid using CSI mode to mount FUSE file systems. Alternatively using sidecar mode to mount FUSE file systems is recommended. Refer to [the doc](https://github.com/fluid-cloudnative/fluid/blob/master/docs/en/samples/knative.md) to get a full example of how to use sidecar mode.\n\n### References\n\n\nFixed by [Fix rbacs and limit CSI Plugin\u0027s node related access](https://github.com/fluid-cloudnative/fluid/commit/77c8110a3d1ec077ae2bce6bd88d296505db1550)\n\n### Credits\nSpecial thanks to the discoverers of this issue:\n\nNanzi Yang ([nzyang@stu.xidian.edu.cn](mailto:nzyang@stu.xidian.edu.cn))\n",
"id": "GHSA-93xx-cvmc-9w3v",
"modified": "2023-05-09T19:58:47Z",
"published": "2023-05-09T19:58:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fluid-cloudnative/fluid/security/advisories/GHSA-93xx-cvmc-9w3v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30840"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fluid-cloudnative/fluid/commit/77c8110a3d1ec077ae2bce6bd88d296505db1550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fluid-cloudnative/fluid/commit/91c05c32db131997b5ca065e869c9918a125c149"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fluid-cloudnative/fluid"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fluid-cloudnative/fluid/releases/tag/v0.8.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "On a compromised node, the fluid-csi service account can be used to modify node specs"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.