GHSA-93F9-F6HW-V8HV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: reload TDLS header pointer after skb_linearize()
ieee80211_process_tdls_channel_switch() sets tf = skb->data before it calls skb_linearize(), and reads tf->action_code afterwards.
ieee80211_rx_h_data() queues TDLS channel switch requests and responses to the interface after pulling only offsetof(struct ieee80211_tdls_data, u) bytes, so the skb can still be non-linear when the interface work handles it. Drivers that build paged RX skbs do this for every frame that does not fit into the skb head, e.g. iwlwifi (mvm), which is also the only mac80211 driver that sets NL80211_FEATURE_TDLS_CHANNEL_SWITCH. If the remaining data does not fit into the tailroom, skb_linearize() moves the data to a new head and frees the old one, and the action code is then read from freed memory. Depending on what that memory holds by then, the frame is handled as before or ends in the WARN_ON_ONCE() of the default case.
The frame only has to be a data frame with the TDLS ethertype from an authorized peer, e.g. relayed by the AP from another station in the BSS; the read happens before the sender is checked to be a TDLS peer.
Load tf after skb_linearize(), as the request and response handlers already do.
Found by static analysis tool CodeQL.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99771"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: reload TDLS header pointer after skb_linearize()\n\nieee80211_process_tdls_channel_switch() sets tf = skb-\u003edata before it\ncalls skb_linearize(), and reads tf-\u003eaction_code afterwards.\n\nieee80211_rx_h_data() queues TDLS channel switch requests and\nresponses to the interface after pulling only\noffsetof(struct ieee80211_tdls_data, u) bytes, so the skb can still be\nnon-linear when the interface work handles it. Drivers that build\npaged RX skbs do this for every frame that does not fit into the skb\nhead, e.g. iwlwifi (mvm), which is also the only mac80211 driver\nthat sets NL80211_FEATURE_TDLS_CHANNEL_SWITCH. If the remaining data\ndoes not fit into the tailroom, skb_linearize() moves the data to a\nnew head and frees the old one, and the action code is then read from\nfreed memory. Depending on what that memory holds by then, the frame\nis handled as before or ends in the WARN_ON_ONCE() of the default\ncase.\n\nThe frame only has to be a data frame with the TDLS ethertype from an\nauthorized peer, e.g. relayed by the AP from another station in the\nBSS; the read happens before the sender is checked to be a TDLS peer.\n\nLoad tf after skb_linearize(), as the request and response handlers\nalready do.\n\nFound by static analysis tool CodeQL.",
"id": "GHSA-93f9-f6hw-v8hv",
"modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-11-20T06:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16e23c766ecd9f378e09d29ac2ff59c88a656da5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25af938d604fa729e0d5292b4f56bc81aa8d0d25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35c5a5ea4418571997a7e7af3e7e8922b136f6e6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5251ad1a6caa35e6d8378aadb909d3f0a675f321"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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