Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-8XJW-MV36-C7HQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:42 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:33

Details

** DISPUTED ** The default configuration of Microsoft Windows 7 immediately prefers a new IPv6 and DHCPv6 service over a currently used IPv4 and DHCPv4 service upon receipt of an IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA), and does not provide an option to ignore an unexpected RA, which allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks on communication with external IPv4 servers via vectors involving RAs, a DHCPv6 server, and NAT-PT on the local network, aka a "SLAAC Attack." NOTE: it can be argued that preferring IPv6 complies with RFC 3484, and that attempting to determine the legitimacy of an RA is currently outside the scope of recommended behavior of host operating systems.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2011-1652"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2011-04-06T17:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "** DISPUTED ** The default configuration of Microsoft Windows 7 immediately prefers a new IPv6 and DHCPv6 service over a currently used IPv4 and DHCPv4 service upon receipt of an IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA), and does not provide an option to ignore an unexpected RA, which allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks on communication with external IPv4 servers via vectors involving RAs, a DHCPv6 server, and NAT-PT on the local network, aka a \"SLAAC Attack.\" NOTE: it can be argued that preferring IPv6 complies with RFC 3484, and that attempting to determine the legitimacy of an RA is currently outside the scope of recommended behavior of host operating systems.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xjw-mv36-c7hq",
  "modified": "2024-03-21T03:33:03Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T05:42:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1652"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.immunityinc.com/pipermail/dailydave/20110404/000122.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/slaac-attack"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

CVE-2011-1652 (GCVE-0-2011-1652)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2011-04-06 17:00 – Updated: 2024-09-16 20:41 Disputed

Summary

The default configuration of Microsoft Windows 7 immediately prefers a new IPv6 and DHCPv6 service over a currently used IPv4 and DHCPv4 service upon receipt of an IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA), and does not provide an option to ignore an unexpected RA, which allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks on communication with external IPv4 servers via vectors involving RAs, a DHCPv6 server, and NAT-PT on the local network, aka a "SLAAC Attack." NOTE: it can be argued that preferring IPv6 complies with RFC 3484, and that attempting to determine the legitimacy of an RA is currently outside the scope of recommended behavior of host operating systems

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

Assigner

mitre mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/slaac-attack/	x_refsource_MISC
https://lists.immunityinc.com/pipermail/dailydave…	mailing-listx_refsource_MLIST

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{
  "containers": {
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        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-08-06T22:37:25.625Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "x_refsource_MISC",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/slaac-attack/"
          },
          {
            "name": "[dailydave] 20110404 SLAAC Attack - 0day Windows Network Interception Configuration Vulnerability",
            "tags": [
              "mailing-list",
              "x_refsource_MLIST",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "https://lists.immunityinc.com/pipermail/dailydave/20110404/000122.html"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
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          "product": "n/a",
          "vendor": "n/a",
          "versions": [
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        }
      ],
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            }
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      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
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      },
      "references": [
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          "url": "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/slaac-attack/"
        },
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          "name": "[dailydave] 20110404 SLAAC Attack - 0day Windows Network Interception Configuration Vulnerability",
          "tags": [
            "mailing-list",
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          ],
          "url": "https://lists.immunityinc.com/pipermail/dailydave/20110404/000122.html"
        }
      ],
      "tags": [
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      ],
      "x_legacyV4Record": {
        "CVE_data_meta": {
          "ASSIGNER": "cve@mitre.org",
          "ID": "CVE-2011-1652",
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        },
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                "product": {
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                      "version": {
                        "version_data": [
                          {
                            "version_value": "n/a"
                          }
                        ]
                      }
                    }
                  ]
                },
                "vendor_name": "n/a"
              }
            ]
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        },
        "data_format": "MITRE",
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        "description": {
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        "references": {
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              "name": "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/slaac-attack/",
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              "url": "http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/slaac-attack/"
            },
            {
              "name": "[dailydave] 20110404 SLAAC Attack - 0day Windows Network Interception Configuration Vulnerability",
              "refsource": "MLIST",
              "url": "https://lists.immunityinc.com/pipermail/dailydave/20110404/000122.html"
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "8254265b-2729-46b6-b9e3-3dfca2d5bfca",
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    "datePublished": "2011-04-06T17:00:00.000Z",
    "dateReserved": "2011-04-06T00:00:00.000Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-09-16T20:41:51.749Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.