GHSA-8X7W-6563-2C2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/nouveau/uvmm: fix premature region free on failed OP_UNMAP_SPARSE
In nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_submit()'s OP_UNMAP_SPARSE arm, op->reg is set from nouveau_uvma_region_find(), which only looks the region up and takes no reference; a region's sole reference is its membership in uvmm->region_mt. Two failure paths leave op->reg set: the -ENOENT check when the region is busy, and the drm_gpuvm_sm_unmap_ops_create() failure. The sibling nouveau_uvmm_sm_unmap_prepare() failure just below clears op->reg; these two do not.
unwind_continue steps back one op, so the failing op is skipped by the unwind loop and its op->reg stays set. nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_cleanup() then enters its if (op->reg) branch and calls nouveau_uvma_region_remove() and nouveau_uvma_region_put() on it, dropping the tree's sole reference and freeing a region this job never created. The comment above the cleanup loop documents the broken invariant: op->reg must be NULL on submit failure.
This frees a live region on an unrelated failure, reachable single-job when drm_gpuvm_sm_unmap_ops_create() returns -ENOMEM; if another job owns the same region, its cleanup then removes and puts the freed region, a use-after-free. Clear op->reg on both failure paths.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89801"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:16:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/nouveau/uvmm: fix premature region free on failed OP_UNMAP_SPARSE\n\nIn nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_submit()\u0027s OP_UNMAP_SPARSE arm, op-\u003ereg is set\nfrom nouveau_uvma_region_find(), which only looks the region up and takes\nno reference; a region\u0027s sole reference is its membership in\nuvmm-\u003eregion_mt. Two failure paths leave op-\u003ereg set: the -ENOENT check\nwhen the region is busy, and the drm_gpuvm_sm_unmap_ops_create() failure.\nThe sibling nouveau_uvmm_sm_unmap_prepare() failure just below clears\nop-\u003ereg; these two do not.\n\nunwind_continue steps back one op, so the failing op is skipped by the\nunwind loop and its op-\u003ereg stays set. nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_cleanup()\nthen enters its if (op-\u003ereg) branch and calls nouveau_uvma_region_remove()\nand nouveau_uvma_region_put() on it, dropping the tree\u0027s sole reference\nand freeing a region this job never created. The comment above the\ncleanup loop documents the broken invariant: op-\u003ereg must be NULL on\nsubmit failure.\n\nThis frees a live region on an unrelated failure, reachable single-job\nwhen drm_gpuvm_sm_unmap_ops_create() returns -ENOMEM; if another job owns\nthe same region, its cleanup then removes and puts the freed region, a\nuse-after-free. Clear op-\u003ereg on both failure paths.",
"id": "GHSA-8x7w-6563-2c2q",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:30:57Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89801"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24c25b182d17d1bdfde0088c96bdf6f93e8f46bc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4083d24c2636fde7b18076115af52820d203bc57"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/88114e3a96582882e63b2f73aa7a5a9cf0d5073c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba42d8a1c2c7629c61914df11a7d63ac77449ffb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccf930812f23b8259ef64fd3394d53b093e4651a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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