GHSA-8X7J-92R4-99VR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-03 15:32 – Updated: 2026-11-03 15:32AzuraCast before 0.24.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows station users with WebHooks permission to bypass the UserUrlFilter guard via the Mastodon, Telegram, GroupMe, and RadioReg connectors. Attackers can set instance_url, api, or webhookurl to internal addresses and trigger the webhook test endpoint to reach loopback, private-network, or cloud-metadata services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-121431"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-03T15:17:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "AzuraCast before 0.24.0 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows station users with WebHooks permission to bypass the UserUrlFilter guard via the Mastodon, Telegram, GroupMe, and RadioReg connectors. Attackers can set instance_url, api, or webhookurl to internal addresses and trigger the webhook test endpoint to reach loopback, private-network, or cloud-metadata services.",
"id": "GHSA-8x7j-92r4-99vr",
"modified": "2026-11-03T15:32:15Z",
"published": "2026-11-03T15:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-qh22-76gf-qwc4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-121431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/azuracast-before-0.24.0-ssrf-filter-bypass-via-webhook-connectors"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
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