GHSA-8X2C-32P7-VM7C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-19 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kho: skip KHO for crash kernel
kho_fill_kimage() unconditionally populates the kimage with KHO metadata for every kexec image type. When the image is a crash kernel, this can be problematic as the crash kernel can run in a small reserved region and the KHO scratch areas can sit outside it. The crash kernel then faults during kho_memory_init() when it tries phys_to_virt() on the KHO FDT address:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address xxxxxxxx ... fdt_offset_ptr+... fdt_check_node_offset_+... fdt_first_property_offset+... fdt_get_property_namelen_+... fdt_getprop+... kho_memory_init+... mm_core_init+... start_kernel+...
kho_locate_mem_hole() already skips KHO logic for KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH images, but kho_fill_kimage() was missing the same guard. As kho_fill_kimage() is the single point that populates image->kho.fdt and image->kho.scratch, fixing it here is sufficient for both arm64 and x86 as the FDT and boot_params path are bailing out when these fields are unset.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64167"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-19T16:17:58Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nkho: skip KHO for crash kernel\n\nkho_fill_kimage() unconditionally populates the kimage with KHO\nmetadata for every kexec image type. When the image is a crash kernel,\nthis can be problematic as the crash kernel can run in a small reserved\nregion and the KHO scratch areas can sit outside it.\nThe crash kernel then faults during kho_memory_init() when it\ntries phys_to_virt() on the KHO FDT address:\n\n Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address xxxxxxxx\n ...\n fdt_offset_ptr+...\n fdt_check_node_offset_+...\n fdt_first_property_offset+...\n fdt_get_property_namelen_+...\n fdt_getprop+...\n kho_memory_init+...\n mm_core_init+...\n start_kernel+...\n\nkho_locate_mem_hole() already skips KHO logic for KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH\nimages, but kho_fill_kimage() was missing the same guard. As\nkho_fill_kimage() is the single point that populates image-\u003ekho.fdt\nand image-\u003ekho.scratch, fixing it here is sufficient for both arm64\nand x86 as the FDT and boot_params path are bailing out when these\nfields are unset.",
"id": "GHSA-8x2c-32p7-vm7c",
"modified": "2026-07-19T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64167"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6715d7ec472a476db17787697a4abda62962284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6ac6721326a75ff2d14c68db05f93b576d8762f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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