GHSA-8WG2-H9C3-Q8HH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-18 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-18 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue()
ieee80211_monitor_select_queue() validates the skb length using skb->len before dereferencing pointers into skb->data to access the 802.11 header. However, skb->len includes data in both the linear head buffer and non-linear fragments/pages. When AF_PACKET sends a packet large enough to become non-linear, the 802.11 header at skb->data + len_rthdr may extend past the linear head buffer even though skb->len appears sufficient.
This leads to a slab-out-of-bounds read when accessing hdr->frame_control, as the kernel reads beyond the allocated skb head buffer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0x1ed/0x220
syzbot has hit the same issues.
Fix this by checking skb_headlen(skb) (which gives the length of the linear data region) instead of skb->len before dereferencing skb->data pointers. This ensures the required bytes are actually present in the linear portion of the skb.
Apply the same fix to ieee80211_validate_radiotap_len() which has the same class of bug: it uses skb->len to validate accesses to skb->data, and to the corresponding checks in ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit(): for drivers advertising NETIF_F_SG the skb is not linearized before ndo_start_xmit, so the 802.11 header can be read past the linear buffer there as well.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98810"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-18T16:17:35Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue()\n\nieee80211_monitor_select_queue() validates the skb length using skb-\u003elen\nbefore dereferencing pointers into skb-\u003edata to access the 802.11 header.\nHowever, skb-\u003elen includes data in both the linear head buffer and\nnon-linear fragments/pages. When AF_PACKET sends a packet large enough to\nbecome non-linear, the 802.11 header at skb-\u003edata + len_rthdr may extend\npast the linear head buffer even though skb-\u003elen appears sufficient.\n\nThis leads to a slab-out-of-bounds read when accessing hdr-\u003eframe_control,\nas the kernel reads beyond the allocated skb head buffer:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0x1ed/0x220\n\nsyzbot has hit the same issues.\n\nFix this by checking skb_headlen(skb) (which gives the length of the\nlinear data region) instead of skb-\u003elen before dereferencing skb-\u003edata\npointers. This ensures the required bytes are actually present in the\nlinear portion of the skb.\n\nApply the same fix to ieee80211_validate_radiotap_len() which has the\nsame class of bug: it uses skb-\u003elen to validate accesses to skb-\u003edata,\nand to the corresponding checks in ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit(): for\ndrivers advertising NETIF_F_SG the skb is not linearized before\nndo_start_xmit, so the 802.11 header can be read past the linear\nbuffer there as well.",
"id": "GHSA-8wg2-h9c3-q8hh",
"modified": "2026-10-18T18:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-10-18T18:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63e7064b4c1c4b540bf2f0cba47384f92ab95307"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f63e919fe1e335b8abcb3a28bfd4804a98d875a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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