{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54077"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-776",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe SQL `IMPORT DATABASE` statement did not require administrative privileges and passed its source URL to the importer without validation. Any authenticated user with SQL command access (not only `root`/administrators) could therefore:\n\n- **Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918):** cause the server to issue HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary destinations, including cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) and internal-only services, and ingest the responses as queryable records.\n- **Arbitrary local file read (CWE-22):** read local files reachable by the server process (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, credential files) by importing `file://` paths, exposing their contents as records.\n\nThe server administration endpoint (`/api/v1/server`) was already restricted to the `root` user and was **not** affected; the exposure was through the database SQL command/query endpoints (`/api/v1/command`, `/api/v1/query`).\n\nA related lower-severity hardening gap (CWE-776): the XML importer did not disable DTD processing, leaving entity-expansion (Billion Laughs) possible.\n\n### Affected component\n\n`integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java` (no host allow-list for http(s); no path validation for `file://`), reached from `engine/.../query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java`.\n\n### Patches\n\n- `IMPORT DATABASE` now requires the administrative `updateSecurity` permission (no-op in embedded mode).\n- Import sources are validated in `SourceDiscovery`: HTTP(S) hosts resolving to loopback / link-local / private (site-local) / wildcard / multicast addresses are blocked by default (`arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks`, default `true`), and an optional local-path allow-list (`arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths`) restricts `file://` reads.\n- The XML importer now disables DTD processing and external entities.\n\nFixed in commit referenced by pull request [#4422](https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/pull/4422).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict SQL command/query access to trusted administrative users; do not grant query access to untrusted users on servers that can reach sensitive networks or hold sensitive local files. Upgrading is strongly recommended.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Bin Luo (luob87709@gmail.com).",
  "id": "GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg",
  "modified": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
  "published": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/releases/tag/26.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users"
}