GHSA-8VQH-RJH4-52QH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-08-25 09:30A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was found in multiple AWX notification backends. The webhook, Mattermost, Rocket.Chat, and Grafana notification backends use notification template URLs as direct HTTP request targets without validating the target address against private, loopback, or reserved IP ranges. An organization notification administrator can create notification templates pointing to internal or loopback addresses, causing the AWX control node to issue HTTP requests to services that are not externally accessible. Additionally, the webhook notification backend follows HTTP redirects and resends configured Basic Authentication credentials to redirect targets regardless of host change, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate notification credentials by redirecting to an attacker-controlled host. The Grafana backend sends its API key in the Authorization header to the configured target URL.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71366"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-24T16:17:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was found in multiple AWX notification backends. The webhook, Mattermost, Rocket.Chat, and Grafana notification backends use notification template URLs as direct HTTP request targets without validating the target address against private, loopback, or reserved IP ranges. An organization notification administrator can create notification templates pointing to internal or loopback addresses, causing the AWX control node to issue HTTP requests to services that are not externally accessible. Additionally, the webhook notification backend follows HTTP redirects and resends configured Basic Authentication credentials to redirect targets regardless of host change, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate notification credentials by redirecting to an attacker-controlled host. The Grafana backend sends its API key in the Authorization header to the configured target URL.",
"id": "GHSA-8vqh-rjh4-52qh",
"modified": "2026-08-25T09:30:36Z",
"published": "2026-08-24T18:31:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71366"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:59135"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:59136"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:59153"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:59155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71366"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2511902"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.