GHSA-8VC8-R56F-P9FC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing: Fix use-after-free in trace_pipe read on sub-buffer order change

Writing to buffer_subbuf_size_kb calls ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(), which frees every sub-buffer of the ring buffer, including the reader page, and replaces them with newly allocated ones.

Readers of trace_pipe hold pointers into those pages. ring_buffer_peek() looks up an event under cpu_buffer->reader_lock but returns the event pointer after dropping the lock, and peek_next_entry() then calls ring_buffer_event_length() and ring_buffer_event_data() on it. If the sub-buffer order is changed in that window, the reader dereferences freed memory:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ring_buffer_peek+0x3e0/0x430 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88802a4cf010 by task syz-executor989/6002

Freed by: free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:398 [inline] ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x1325/0x18e0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7444 buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x182/0x280 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221

Take trace_access_lock(RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) around the order change. This is the lock trace_pipe readers already hold across their entire peek-and-print loop, so the swap can no longer race with a reader that is dereferencing a peeked event.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-89747"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:20:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntracing: Fix use-after-free in trace_pipe read on sub-buffer order change\n\nWriting to buffer_subbuf_size_kb calls ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set(),\nwhich frees every sub-buffer of the ring buffer, including the reader\npage, and replaces them with newly allocated ones.\n\nReaders of trace_pipe hold pointers into those pages. ring_buffer_peek()\nlooks up an event under cpu_buffer-\u003ereader_lock but returns the event\npointer after dropping the lock, and peek_next_entry() then calls\nring_buffer_event_length() and ring_buffer_event_data() on it. If the\nsub-buffer order is changed in that window, the reader dereferences\nfreed memory:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ring_buffer_peek+0x3e0/0x430\n  Read of size 1 at addr ffff88802a4cf010 by task syz-executor989/6002\n\n  Freed by:\n   free_buffer_page kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:398 [inline]\n   ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set+0x1325/0x18e0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7444\n   buffer_subbuf_size_write+0x182/0x280 kernel/trace/trace.c:8221\n\nTake trace_access_lock(RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) around the order change.\nThis is the lock trace_pipe readers already hold across their entire\npeek-and-print loop, so the swap can no longer race with a reader that\nis dereferencing a peeked event.",
  "id": "GHSA-8vc8-r56f-p9fc",
  "modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:29Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T21:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89747"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05ebe1e1d7d38c2612bacfefe043a33572ae34cb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/372f8534244d632ad5118e8a87a11291b01712d3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a49d19ff9baaf61217e5ec14199c18bc2d93ee4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddbe921ed16a0ad2d9e09574c3f3aabec7528325"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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