GHSA-8V7X-4VVG-PGR3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 18:31 – Updated: 2025-09-23 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/region: Do not try to cleanup after cxl_region_setup_targets() fails
Commit 5e42bcbc3fef ("cxl/region: decrement ->nr_targets on error in cxl_region_attach()") tried to avoid 'eiw' initialization errors when ->nr_targets exceeded 16, by just decrementing ->nr_targets when cxl_region_setup_targets() failed.
Commit 86987c766276 ("cxl/region: Cleanup target list on attach error") extended that cleanup to also clear cxled->pos and p->targets[pos]. The initialization error was incidentally fixed separately by: Commit 8d4285425714 ("cxl/region: Fix port setup uninitialized variable warnings") which was merged a few days after 5e42bcbc3fef.
But now the original cleanup when cxl_region_setup_targets() fails prevents endpoint and switch decoder resources from being reused:
1) the cleanup does not set the decoder's region to NULL, which results in future dpa_size_store() calls returning -EBUSY 2) the decoder is not properly freed, which results in future commit errors associated with the upstream switch
Now that the initialization errors were fixed separately, the proper cleanup for this case is to just return immediately. Then the resources associated with this target get cleanup up as normal when the failed region is deleted.
The ->nr_targets decrement in the error case also helped prevent a p->targets[] array overflow, so add a new check to prevent against that overflow.
Tested by trying to create an invalid region for a 2 switch * 2 endpoint topology, and then following up with creating a valid region.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-52792"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-908"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T16:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncxl/region: Do not try to cleanup after cxl_region_setup_targets() fails\n\nCommit 5e42bcbc3fef (\"cxl/region: decrement -\u003enr_targets on error in\ncxl_region_attach()\") tried to avoid \u0027eiw\u0027 initialization errors when\n-\u003enr_targets exceeded 16, by just decrementing -\u003enr_targets when\ncxl_region_setup_targets() failed.\n\nCommit 86987c766276 (\"cxl/region: Cleanup target list on attach error\")\nextended that cleanup to also clear cxled-\u003epos and p-\u003etargets[pos]. The\ninitialization error was incidentally fixed separately by:\nCommit 8d4285425714 (\"cxl/region: Fix port setup uninitialized variable\nwarnings\") which was merged a few days after 5e42bcbc3fef.\n\nBut now the original cleanup when cxl_region_setup_targets() fails\nprevents endpoint and switch decoder resources from being reused:\n\n1) the cleanup does not set the decoder\u0027s region to NULL, which results\n in future dpa_size_store() calls returning -EBUSY\n2) the decoder is not properly freed, which results in future commit\n errors associated with the upstream switch\n\nNow that the initialization errors were fixed separately, the proper\ncleanup for this case is to just return immediately. Then the resources\nassociated with this target get cleanup up as normal when the failed\nregion is deleted.\n\nThe -\u003enr_targets decrement in the error case also helped prevent\na p-\u003etargets[] array overflow, so add a new check to prevent against\nthat overflow.\n\nTested by trying to create an invalid region for a 2 switch * 2 endpoint\ntopology, and then following up with creating a valid region.",
"id": "GHSA-8v7x-4vvg-pgr3",
"modified": "2025-09-23T21:30:53Z",
"published": "2024-05-21T18:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0718588c7aaa7a1510b4de972370535b61dddd0d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07ffcd8ec79cf7383e1e45815f4842fd357991c2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9090c5537c93cd0811ab7bfbd925b57addfffb60"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90db4c1d5ebaf574d3c3065c055977982c378a83"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.