GHSA-8V59-QMWV-4P6Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:58 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:58Impact
0.31.0 fixed GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6, where text from a Compose file became GitHub Actions workflow commands in compose-lint's output. The fix escapes the command openers in compose-lint's own output, but not in the argument parser's error messages. When a repository path reaches compose-lint's arguments without a -- before it, the argument parser prints it raw in its error message. That includes a carriage return, which the runner treats as a line break, so a command can also start a new line there.
A pull request can therefore create annotations, fold or hide parts of the job log, or issue other commands the runner accepts, when CI runs compose-lint over it, before anyone reviews it. The pass/fail result is not changed.
Affected setups pass repository paths to compose-lint without a -- before them: the pre-commit hook when args: is set without the documented trailing --, or the compose-lint package or Docker image called that way in a workflow. The pre-commit hook's default configuration passes -- and is not affected. The GitHub Action turns command processing off around each compose-lint run, so it is not affected.
Found during an internal pre-1.0 security review. It was first published as part of GHSA-r7j4-crjv-h467, together with four other gaps in the same fix. Each gap now has its own advisory.
Docker image. composelint/compose-lint tag 0.31.0 and the matching minor tag are affected, as was latest while it pointed to 0.31.0.
Releases before 0.31.0 are covered by GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6.
Patches
Fixed in 0.32.0. The argument parser's messages go through the same sanitizer as the rest of compose-lint's output.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to 0.32.0 or later.
- End the pre-commit hook's
args:with--, and put--before file paths when calling compose-lint directly. - On GitHub Actions, use the
tmatens/compose-lintAction, or bracket the compose-lint step with::stop-commands::<random token>and::<token>::, as the Action does.
Reproduction
On compose-lint 0.31.0 on a GitHub-hosted runner (runner 2.337.0), compose-lint '--##[warning]X/compose.yml' with no -- creates an annotation. The same path after -- creates none. The composelint/compose-lint:0.31.0 image produces byte-identical output to the package.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "compose-lint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.31.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.31.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125123"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-117",
"CWE-150"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:58:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-10T17:17:26Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n0.31.0 fixed GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6, where text from a Compose file became GitHub Actions workflow commands in compose-lint\u0027s output. The fix escapes the command openers in compose-lint\u0027s own output, but not in the argument parser\u0027s error messages. When a repository path reaches compose-lint\u0027s arguments without a `--` before it, the argument parser prints it raw in its error message. That includes a carriage return, which the runner treats as a line break, so a command can also start a new line there.\n\nA pull request can therefore create annotations, fold or hide parts of the job log, or issue other commands the runner accepts, when CI runs compose-lint over it, before anyone reviews it. The pass/fail result is not changed.\n\nAffected setups pass repository paths to compose-lint without a `--` before them: the pre-commit hook when `args:` is set without the documented trailing `--`, or the `compose-lint` package or Docker image called that way in a workflow. The pre-commit hook\u0027s default configuration passes `--` and is not affected. The GitHub Action turns command processing off around each compose-lint run, so it is not affected.\n\nFound during an internal pre-1.0 security review. It was first published as part of GHSA-r7j4-crjv-h467, together with four other gaps in the same fix. Each gap now has its own advisory.\n\n**Docker image.** `composelint/compose-lint` tag 0.31.0 and the matching minor tag are affected, as was `latest` while it pointed to 0.31.0.\n\nReleases before 0.31.0 are covered by GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 0.32.0. The argument parser\u0027s messages go through the same sanitizer as the rest of compose-lint\u0027s output.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to 0.32.0 or later.\n- End the pre-commit hook\u0027s `args:` with `--`, and put `--` before file paths when calling compose-lint directly.\n- On GitHub Actions, use the `tmatens/compose-lint` Action, or bracket the compose-lint step with `::stop-commands::\u003crandom token\u003e` and `::\u003ctoken\u003e::`, as the Action does.\n\n### Reproduction\n\nOn compose-lint 0.31.0 on a GitHub-hosted runner (runner 2.337.0), `compose-lint \u0027--##[warning]X/compose.yml\u0027` with no `--` creates an annotation. The same path after `--` creates none. The `composelint/compose-lint:0.31.0` image produces byte-identical output to the package.",
"id": "GHSA-8v59-qmwv-4p6q",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:58:53Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:58:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/security/advisories/GHSA-8v59-qmwv-4p6q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/pull/945"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/commit/542e63126f795564a65c63887ea0dc558a500688"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tmatens/compose-lint/releases/tag/v0.32.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "compose-lint: File paths embedded in pull requests can inject CI workflow commands through command-line error messages\u00a0"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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