GHSA-8R7F-R8HJ-R3RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 20:46 – Updated: 2026-07-24 20:46Summary
GET /api/v4/user/search is available to any logged-in user. The service calls userClient.SearchActive, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and never adds a StatusActive predicate — while the sibling lookups GetActiveByID and GetActiveByDavAccount, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at RedactLevelUser, which includes the email address.
A normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of inactive and banned accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates — the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.
Details
Root cause (verified at 26b6b10)
1. Route — logged-in + UserInfo.Read scope (routers/router.go):
user := v4.Group("user") // protected user group (login required)
user.GET("search",
middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),
controllers.FromQuery[usersvc.SearchUserService](...), controllers.UserSearch)
The RequiredScopes check applies to scoped OAuth tokens; plain session requests are not gated by it — so any logged-in user reaches the search.
2. Service — 2-char keyword to SearchActive (service/user/info.go):
type SearchUserService struct { Keyword string `form:"keyword" binding:"required,min=2"` }
const resultLimit = 10
func (s *SearchUserService) Search(c *gin.Context) ([]*ent.User, error) {
return dep.UserClient().SearchActive(c, resultLimit, s.Keyword)
}
3. The bug — SearchActive has no status predicate (inventory/user.go):
func (c *userClient) SearchActive(ctx context.Context, limit int, keyword string) ([]*ent.User, error) {
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, LoadUserGroup{}, true)
return withUserEagerLoading(ctx,
c.client.User.Query().
Where(user.Or(user.EmailContainsFold(keyword), user.NickContainsFold(keyword))).
Limit(limit), // <-- no user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)
).All(ctx)
}
Contrast the siblings immediately above:
func (c *userClient) GetActiveByID(...) { ... Where(user.ID(id)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }
func (c *userClient) GetActiveByDavAccount(...) { ... Where(user.EmailEqualFold(email)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }
withUserEagerLoading only eager-loads the group/passkey edges; it adds no status filter. Status values are active/inactive/manual_banned/sys_banned (ent/user/user.go).
4. No global status interceptor — User.Mixin() is CommonMixin{} (ent/schema/user.go), whose Interceptors() returns only softDeleteInterceptors (ent/schema/common.go). Inactive/banned users are not soft-deleted, so nothing filters them out at query time.
5. Results serialized with email (routers/controllers/user.go → service/user/response.go):
// UserSearch:
return user.BuildUserRedacted(item, user.RedactLevelUser, hasher)
// BuildUserRedacted:
if level == RedactLevelUser { user.Email = userRaw.Email } // email included
Secondary path: GET /api/v4/user/info/:id → GetUser uses GetByID (no status filter), and the controller picks RedactLevelUser for any non-anonymous caller (RedactLevelAnonymous only for anonymous). So a logged-in caller with an inactive/banned user's hashed ID also receives the email-bearing profile. (Less practical than search, since it needs the hashed ID rather than a 2-char keyword.)
Steps to reproduce (requires a live instance)
- Ensure a target account exists in
inactiveormanual_banned/sys_bannedstatus (e.g., an unconfirmed registration or a banned user). - As any logged-in user:
GET /api/v4/user/search?keyword=<>=2 chars of the target email/nick> Cookie: cloudreve-session=<attacker-session> - Observe the inactive/banned account in the results, including its
email. Expected: only active accounts appear (matching the method name and the siblingGetActive*behavior). Actual: inactive/banned accounts are returned with their email addresses.
Impact
Any logged-in user can enumerate and harvest the email addresses (and basic profile metadata) of inactive and banned accounts that active-user lookups intentionally hide. No account access, passwords, or 2FA secrets are exposed; the impact is PII leakage and user enumeration.
Remediation
- Add
Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive))toSearchActive(matchingGetActiveByID). - Apply the same active-status requirement to
GET /api/v4/user/info/:id, or fall back to anonymous-level redaction unless the target account is active. - Consider not returning email from directory search at all — display name + hashed ID is usually sufficient.
- Regression tests: searching a keyword that matches an inactive/banned account must return no result (or no email).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0-20260613023921-7e1289d55279"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.0.0-20250225100611-da4e44b77af4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55496"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-359"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T20:46:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n \n`GET /api/v4/user/search` is available to any logged-in user. The service calls `userClient.SearchActive`, but despite its name that method filters only by email/nickname keyword and **never adds a `StatusActive` predicate** \u2014 while the sibling lookups `GetActiveByID` and `GetActiveByDavAccount`, defined a few lines above it, do. Search hits are serialized at `RedactLevelUser`, which includes the email address.\n \nA normal logged-in user can therefore enumerate and retrieve the email (plus nickname, avatar, creation time, redacted group, profile share-visibility) of **inactive and banned** accounts that an active-user directory is supposed to suppress. No global status interceptor compensates \u2014 the only User query interceptor is soft-delete, and inactive/banned rows are not soft-deleted.\n\n### Details\n## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`)\n \n**1. Route \u2014 logged-in + `UserInfo.Read` scope** (`routers/router.go`):\n```go\nuser := v4.Group(\"user\") // protected user group (login required)\nuser.GET(\"search\",\n middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeUserInfoRead),\n controllers.FromQuery[usersvc.SearchUserService](...), controllers.UserSearch)\n```\nThe `RequiredScopes` check applies to scoped OAuth tokens; plain session requests are not gated by it \u2014 so any logged-in user reaches the search.\n \n**2. Service \u2014 2-char keyword to `SearchActive`** (`service/user/info.go`):\n```go\ntype SearchUserService struct { Keyword string `form:\"keyword\" binding:\"required,min=2\"` }\nconst resultLimit = 10\nfunc (s *SearchUserService) Search(c *gin.Context) ([]*ent.User, error) {\n return dep.UserClient().SearchActive(c, resultLimit, s.Keyword)\n}\n```\n \n**3. The bug \u2014 `SearchActive` has no status predicate** (`inventory/user.go`):\n```go\nfunc (c *userClient) SearchActive(ctx context.Context, limit int, keyword string) ([]*ent.User, error) {\n ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, LoadUserGroup{}, true)\n return withUserEagerLoading(ctx,\n c.client.User.Query().\n Where(user.Or(user.EmailContainsFold(keyword), user.NickContainsFold(keyword))).\n Limit(limit), // \u003c-- no user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)\n ).All(ctx)\n}\n```\nContrast the siblings immediately above:\n```go\nfunc (c *userClient) GetActiveByID(...) { ... Where(user.ID(id)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }\nfunc (c *userClient) GetActiveByDavAccount(...) { ... Where(user.EmailEqualFold(email)).Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive)) ... }\n```\n`withUserEagerLoading` only eager-loads the group/passkey edges; it adds no status filter. Status values are `active`/`inactive`/`manual_banned`/`sys_banned` (`ent/user/user.go`).\n \n**4. No global status interceptor** \u2014 `User.Mixin()` is `CommonMixin{}` (`ent/schema/user.go`), whose `Interceptors()` returns only `softDeleteInterceptors` (`ent/schema/common.go`). Inactive/banned users are not soft-deleted, so nothing filters them out at query time.\n \n**5. Results serialized with email** (`routers/controllers/user.go` \u2192 `service/user/response.go`):\n```go\n// UserSearch:\nreturn user.BuildUserRedacted(item, user.RedactLevelUser, hasher)\n// BuildUserRedacted:\nif level == RedactLevelUser { user.Email = userRaw.Email } // email included\n```\n \n**Secondary path:** `GET /api/v4/user/info/:id` \u2192 `GetUser` uses `GetByID` (no status filter), and the controller picks `RedactLevelUser` for any non-anonymous caller (`RedactLevelAnonymous` only for anonymous). So a logged-in caller with an inactive/banned user\u0027s hashed ID also receives the email-bearing profile. (Less practical than search, since it needs the hashed ID rather than a 2-char keyword.)\n\n## Steps to reproduce (requires a live instance)\n \n1. Ensure a target account exists in `inactive` or `manual_banned`/`sys_banned` status (e.g., an unconfirmed registration or a banned user).\n2. As any logged-in user:\n ```\n GET /api/v4/user/search?keyword=\u003c\u003e=2 chars of the target email/nick\u003e\n Cookie: cloudreve-session=\u003cattacker-session\u003e\n ```\n3. Observe the inactive/banned account in the results, including its `email`.\n**Expected:** only active accounts appear (matching the method name and the sibling `GetActive*` behavior).\n**Actual:** inactive/banned accounts are returned with their email addresses.\n \n## Impact\n \nAny logged-in user can enumerate and harvest the email addresses (and basic profile metadata) of inactive and banned accounts that active-user lookups intentionally hide. No account access, passwords, or 2FA secrets are exposed; the impact is PII leakage and user enumeration.\n \n## Remediation\n \n- Add `Where(user.StatusEQ(user.StatusActive))` to `SearchActive` (matching `GetActiveByID`).\n- Apply the same active-status requirement to `GET /api/v4/user/info/:id`, or fall back to anonymous-level redaction unless the target account is active.\n- Consider not returning email from directory search at all \u2014 display name + hashed ID is usually sufficient.\n- Regression tests: searching a keyword that matches an inactive/banned account must return no result (or no email).",
"id": "GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv",
"modified": "2026-07-24T20:46:49Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T20:46:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/security/advisories/GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/commit/7e1289d552794bdbeb551be78456115c87dcb3da"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudreve/cloudreve/releases/tag/4.17.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cloudreve: Information Exposure in `GET /api/v4/user/search`: `SearchActive` omits the active-status predicate, leaking inactive/banned account emails"
}
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