GHSA-8QC4-XRRP-XX3V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-03 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: kalmia: bound RX frame length in kalmia_rx_fixup()
kalmia_rx_fixup() computes usb_packet_length = skb->len - (2 * KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH) as a u16, guarded only by a pre-loop check that skb->len is at least KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH, which is 6. A device can deliver a short bulk-IN frame with skb->len in the 6 to 11 range, or leave a short trailing remainder on a later loop iteration. Either case underflows usb_packet_length to about 65530.
That bypasses the usb_packet_length < ether_packet_length truncation path. The device-supplied ether_packet_length, a le16 up to 65535 read from header_start[2], then drives a memcmp() and the following skb_trim() and skb_pull() past the end of the rx buffer. The rx buffer is hard_mtu * 10, which is 14000 bytes. That is an out of bounds read.
Require both the start and end framing headers to be present before subtracting them, on every loop iteration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64351"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: usb: kalmia: bound RX frame length in kalmia_rx_fixup()\n\nkalmia_rx_fixup() computes usb_packet_length = skb-\u003elen - (2 *\nKALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH) as a u16, guarded only by a pre-loop check that\nskb-\u003elen is at least KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH, which is 6. A device can\ndeliver a short bulk-IN frame with skb-\u003elen in the 6 to 11 range, or\nleave a short trailing remainder on a later loop iteration. Either case\nunderflows usb_packet_length to about 65530.\n\nThat bypasses the usb_packet_length \u003c ether_packet_length truncation path.\nThe device-supplied ether_packet_length, a le16 up to 65535 read from\nheader_start[2], then drives a memcmp() and the following skb_trim() and\nskb_pull() past the end of the rx buffer. The rx buffer is hard_mtu * 10,\nwhich is 14000 bytes. That is an out of bounds read.\n\nRequire both the start and end framing headers to be present before\nsubtracting them, on every loop iteration.",
"id": "GHSA-8qc4-xrrp-xx3v",
"modified": "2026-09-03T18:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64351"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d04c37ed4e1d0f733ad39ec35b5a5d8818b4f4a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/391706889a5112feafdc0c68db3ecc7ed325d09c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46ab32870d010e9a057bc5659cea22b7e728ca88"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/47b6bcef6e679593d2e86e04ee72c46a4e2f7139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51e65f1d78457ea4f9513d90ab22c9dccbb35110"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa4eef2cbb66ea3dfcfc24bdce798dd78a81b54b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c466097d85d52f3aa200736cb4759e66d4bbf6e3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e24eb271061db384a3c3ef6f107fe515e68ef222"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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