GHSA-8M6R-F5M5-X7P9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Fix clone_alias() to use the original device's devid
Currently clone_alias() assumes first argument (pdev) is always the original device pointer. This function is called by pci_for_each_dma_alias() which based on topology decides to send original or alias device details in first argument.
This meant that the source devid used to look up and copy the DTE may be incorrect, leading to wrong or stale DTE entries being propagated to alias device.
Fix this by passing the original pdev as the opaque data argument to both the direct clone_alias() call and pci_for_each_dma_alias(). Inside clone_alias(), retrieve the original device from data and compute devid from it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53053"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-681"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/amd: Fix clone_alias() to use the original device\u0027s devid\n\nCurrently clone_alias() assumes first argument (pdev) is always the\noriginal device pointer. This function is called by\npci_for_each_dma_alias() which based on topology decides to send\noriginal or alias device details in first argument.\n\nThis meant that the source devid used to look up and copy the DTE\nmay be incorrect, leading to wrong or stale DTE entries being\npropagated to alias device.\n\nFix this by passing the original pdev as the opaque data argument to\nboth the direct clone_alias() call and pci_for_each_dma_alias(). Inside\nclone_alias(), retrieve the original device from data and compute devid\nfrom it.",
"id": "GHSA-8m6r-f5m5-x7p9",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:42Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T18:32:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53053"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/166a08644aa509e5d27e154d7fa774f4181df9e0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20b3c566e2702e5d4d0545be8a97029a2eebcc0e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/880a2e6c887c8f51870c0a00dfba3c8519178b65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dae251ff11d2d2208a029f98923756831cefec46"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbd76a537d8cb814e7f5b795ab21ecb7949c821d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/faad224fe0f0857a04ff2eb3c90f0de57f47d0f3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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