GHSA-8JRG-738Q-V5MW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-22 21:30 – Updated: 2025-09-22 21:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/64s: Don't use DSISR for SLB faults

Since commit 46ddcb3950a2 ("powerpc/mm: Show if a bad page fault on data is read or write.") we use page_fault_is_write(regs->dsisr) in __bad_page_fault() to determine if the fault is for a read or write, and change the message printed accordingly.

But SLB faults, aka Data Segment Interrupts, don't set DSISR (Data Storage Interrupt Status Register) to a useful value. All ISA versions from v2.03 through v3.1 specify that the Data Segment Interrupt sets DSISR "to an undefined value". As far as I can see there's no mention of SLB faults setting DSISR in any BookIV content either.

This manifests as accesses that should be a read being incorrectly reported as writes, for example, using the xmon "dump" command:

0:mon> d 0x5deadbeef0000000 5deadbeef0000000 [359526.415354][ C6] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0x5deadbeef0000000 [359526.415611][ C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000010a300 cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf400] pc: c00000000010a300: mread+0x90/0x190

If we disassemble the PC, we see a load instruction:

0:mon> di c00000000010a300 c00000000010a300 89490000 lbz r10,0(r9)

We can also see in exceptions-64s.S that the data_access_slb block doesn't set IDSISR=1, which means it doesn't load DSISR into pt_regs. So the value we're using to determine if the fault is a read/write is some stale value in pt_regs from a previous page fault.

Rework the printing logic to separate the SLB fault case out, and only print read/write in the cases where we can determine it.

The result looks like eg:

0:mon> d 0x5deadbeef0000000 5deadbeef0000000 [ 721.779525][ C6] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0x5deadbeef0000000 [ 721.779697][ C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000014cbe0 cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf390]

0:mon> d 0 0000000000000000 [ 742.793242][ C6] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000000 [ 742.793316][ C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000014cbe0 cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf390]

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-49214"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:00:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npowerpc/64s: Don\u0027t use DSISR for SLB faults\n\nSince commit 46ddcb3950a2 (\"powerpc/mm: Show if a bad page fault on data\nis read or write.\") we use page_fault_is_write(regs-\u003edsisr) in\n__bad_page_fault() to determine if the fault is for a read or write, and\nchange the message printed accordingly.\n\nBut SLB faults, aka Data Segment Interrupts, don\u0027t set DSISR (Data\nStorage Interrupt Status Register) to a useful value. All ISA versions\nfrom v2.03 through v3.1 specify that the Data Segment Interrupt sets\nDSISR \"to an undefined value\". As far as I can see there\u0027s no mention of\nSLB faults setting DSISR in any BookIV content either.\n\nThis manifests as accesses that should be a read being incorrectly\nreported as writes, for example, using the xmon \"dump\" command:\n\n  0:mon\u003e d 0x5deadbeef0000000\n  5deadbeef0000000\n  [359526.415354][    C6] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0x5deadbeef0000000\n  [359526.415611][    C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000010a300\n  cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf400]\n      pc: c00000000010a300: mread+0x90/0x190\n\nIf we disassemble the PC, we see a load instruction:\n\n  0:mon\u003e di c00000000010a300\n  c00000000010a300 89490000      lbz     r10,0(r9)\n\nWe can also see in exceptions-64s.S that the data_access_slb block\ndoesn\u0027t set IDSISR=1, which means it doesn\u0027t load DSISR into pt_regs. So\nthe value we\u0027re using to determine if the fault is a read/write is some\nstale value in pt_regs from a previous page fault.\n\nRework the printing logic to separate the SLB fault case out, and only\nprint read/write in the cases where we can determine it.\n\nThe result looks like eg:\n\n  0:mon\u003e d 0x5deadbeef0000000\n  5deadbeef0000000\n  [  721.779525][    C6] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0x5deadbeef0000000\n  [  721.779697][    C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000014cbe0\n  cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf390]\n\n  0:mon\u003e d 0\n  0000000000000000\n  [  742.793242][    C6] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000000\n  [  742.793316][    C6] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000014cbe0\n  cpu 0x6: Vector: 380 (Data SLB Access) at [c00000000ffbf390]",
  "id": "GHSA-8jrg-738q-v5mw",
  "modified": "2025-09-22T21:30:15Z",
  "published": "2025-09-22T21:30:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49214"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/093449bb182db885dae816d62874cccab7a4c42a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a852ff9b7bea9c640540e2c1bc70bd3ba455d61"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3dae36d632b2cf6eb20314273e512a96cb43c9a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4679ac8ea2e5078704aa1c026db36580cc1bf9a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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