GHSA-8JPR-FF92-HPF9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-20 21:01 – Updated: 2023-11-20 21:01
VLAI
Summary
Run Shell Command allows Cross-Site Request Forgery
Details

Impact

A cross site request forgery vulnerability in the admin tool for executing shell commands on the server allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands by tricking an admin into loading the URL with the shell command. A very simple possibility for an attack are comments. When the attacker can leave a comment on any page in the wiki it is sufficient to include an image with an URL like /xwiki/bin/view/Admin/RunShellCommand?command=touch%20/tmp/attacked in the comment. When an admin views the comment, the file /tmp/attacked will be created on the server. The output of the command is also vulnerable to XWiki syntax injection which offers a simple way to execute Groovy in the context of the XWiki installation and thus an even easier way to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the whole XWiki installation.

Patches

This has been patched by adding a form token check in version 4.5.1 of the admin tools.

Workarounds

The patch can be applied manually to the affected wiki pages. Alternatively, the document Admin.RunShellCommand can also be deleted if the possibility to run shell commands isn't needed.

References

  • https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/ADMINTOOL-91
  • https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/application-admintools/commit/03815c505c9f37006a0c56495e862dc549a39da8
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.xwiki.contrib:xwiki-application-admintools"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.4"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-48292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-20T21:01:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-20T18:15:07Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA cross site request forgery vulnerability in the admin tool for executing shell commands on the server allows an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands by tricking an admin into loading the URL with the shell command. A very simple possibility for an attack are comments. When the attacker can leave a comment on any page in the wiki it is sufficient to include an image with an URL like  `/xwiki/bin/view/Admin/RunShellCommand?command=touch%20/tmp/attacked` in the comment. When an admin views the comment, the file `/tmp/attacked` will be created on the server. The output of the command is also vulnerable to XWiki syntax injection which offers a simple way to execute Groovy in the context of the XWiki installation and thus an even easier way to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of the whole XWiki installation.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been patched by adding a form token check in version 4.5.1 of the admin tools.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe [patch](https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/application-admintools/commit/03815c505c9f37006a0c56495e862dc549a39da8) can be applied manually to the affected wiki pages. Alternatively, the document `Admin.RunShellCommand` can also be deleted if the possibility to run shell commands isn\u0027t needed.\n\n### References\n* https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/ADMINTOOL-91\n* https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/application-admintools/commit/03815c505c9f37006a0c56495e862dc549a39da8\n",
  "id": "GHSA-8jpr-ff92-hpf9",
  "modified": "2023-11-20T21:01:07Z",
  "published": "2023-11-20T21:01:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/application-admintools/security/advisories/GHSA-8jpr-ff92-hpf9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/application-admintools/commit/03815c505c9f37006a0c56495e862dc549a39da8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xwiki-contrib/application-admintools"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/ADMINTOOL-91"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Run Shell Command allows Cross-Site Request Forgery"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.