GHSA-8J4C-6X6G-RQ3J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 19:40 – Updated: 2026-10-08 19:40
VLAI
Summary
music-metadata: uncatchable process crash parsing a crafted `.dsf` (residual of GHSA-v6c2-xwv6-8xf7)
Details

Summary

DsfParser.parseChunks skips an unrecognised chunk's payload with an un-awaited call:

this.tokenizer.ignore(Number(chunkHeader.size) - ChunkHeader.len);   // lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:51 — no await

ChunkHeader.len is 12. A crafted .dsf chunk with id != 'fmt ' and size in 0..11 makes the argument negative; strtok3 (≥ 10.3.5) throws RangeError on a negative ignore. Because the call is fire-and-forget, the rejection is detached from the parseBuffer() promise chain → unhandled rejection → Node's default (≥ 15) crashes the process — after parseBuffer() already resolved, so a caller's try/catch catches nothing and is still taken down.

Residual of GHSA-v6c2-xwv6-8xf7: the ASF site was fixed in 11.12.3 (size validation) and strtok3 now throws on negative ignore; the DSF site was never validated, and its missing await escalates that throw into an uncatchable crash.

Root cause (lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:34-56)

while (bytesRemaining >= ChunkHeader.len) {               // ChunkHeader.len = 12
  const chunkHeader = await this.tokenizer.readToken(ChunkHeader);   // { id, size }
  switch (chunkHeader.id) {
    case 'fmt ': { ...; return; }
    default: this.tokenizer.ignore(Number(chunkHeader.size) - ChunkHeader.len); break;  // size<12 -> negative, no await
  }
  bytesRemaining -= chunkHeader.size;
}

strtok3 AbstractTokenizer.ignore (L78-79): if (length < 0) throw new RangeError('ignore length must be ≥ 0 bytes');

Steps to reproduce

repro/ — public API only, Node's default unhandled-rejection mode, try/catch around the parse:

npm install && node poc.mjs

Confirmed on 11.14.0:

[app] parseBuffer() RESOLVED — the caller saw no error to catch.
RangeError: ignore length must be ≥ 0 bytes
    at DsfParser.parseChunks (.../lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:51)
   <process exits non-zero — the "process survived" line never prints>

Impact

DoS: a single crafted .dsf (or any file with the DSD magic) crashes the Node process of any app parsing untrusted audio with music-metadata (2.2M weekly downloads). The crash bypasses the caller's error handling, so even apps that correctly try/catch per-file parsing are killed — one malicious upload can take down a shared server/worker.

Remediation

Add await on line 51 (makes the RangeError a catchable parse error), and validate chunkHeader.size >= ChunkHeader.len before the skip (as the ASF fix did; also guards the loop counter). Audit other parsers for un-awaited tokenizer.ignore()/readToken().

Scope / honesty

Requires the DSF path (a DSD-magic file — normal auto-detection). Relies on Node's default unhandled-rejection mode (throw, default since Node 15); the point is that the standard defensive per-parse try/catch does not protect against it. Crash (availability), not disclosure/RCE. Negatives confirmed alongside: ASF infinite loop fixed; negative-ignore infinite-loop class closed at strtok3; unbounded allocation bounded by strtok3's read bound-check.

Credits

Issue also reported by @ryu7eroo

Severity
6.2 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.14.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "music-metadata"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107392"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T19:40:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n`DsfParser.parseChunks` skips an unrecognised chunk\u0027s payload with an **un-awaited** call:\n```js\nthis.tokenizer.ignore(Number(chunkHeader.size) - ChunkHeader.len);   // lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:51 \u2014 no await\n```\n`ChunkHeader.len` is 12. A crafted `.dsf` chunk with `id != \u0027fmt \u0027` and `size` in `0..11` makes the\nargument negative; strtok3 (\u2265 10.3.5) throws `RangeError` on a negative `ignore`. Because the call\nis fire-and-forget, the rejection is **detached from the `parseBuffer()` promise chain** \u2192 unhandled\nrejection \u2192 Node\u0027s default (\u2265 15) **crashes the process** \u2014 **after** `parseBuffer()` already\nresolved, so a caller\u0027s `try/catch` catches nothing and is still taken down.\n\nResidual of GHSA-v6c2-xwv6-8xf7: the ASF site was fixed in 11.12.3 (size validation) and strtok3\nnow throws on negative `ignore`; the DSF site was never validated, and its missing `await`\nescalates that throw into an **uncatchable** crash.\n\n## Root cause (`lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:34-56`)\n```js\nwhile (bytesRemaining \u003e= ChunkHeader.len) {               // ChunkHeader.len = 12\n  const chunkHeader = await this.tokenizer.readToken(ChunkHeader);   // { id, size }\n  switch (chunkHeader.id) {\n    case \u0027fmt \u0027: { ...; return; }\n    default: this.tokenizer.ignore(Number(chunkHeader.size) - ChunkHeader.len); break;  // size\u003c12 -\u003e negative, no await\n  }\n  bytesRemaining -= chunkHeader.size;\n}\n```\nstrtok3 `AbstractTokenizer.ignore` (L78-79): `if (length \u003c 0) throw new RangeError(\u0027ignore length must be \u2265 0 bytes\u0027);`\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n`repro/` \u2014 public API only, Node\u0027s default unhandled-rejection mode, `try/catch` around the parse:\n```\nnpm install \u0026\u0026 node poc.mjs\n```\nConfirmed on 11.14.0:\n```\n[app] parseBuffer() RESOLVED \u2014 the caller saw no error to catch.\nRangeError: ignore length must be \u2265 0 bytes\n    at DsfParser.parseChunks (.../lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:51)\n   \u003cprocess exits non-zero \u2014 the \"process survived\" line never prints\u003e\n```\n\n## Impact\nDoS: a single crafted `.dsf` (or any file with the `DSD ` magic) crashes the Node process of any\napp parsing untrusted audio with music-metadata (2.2M weekly downloads). The crash bypasses the\ncaller\u0027s error handling, so even apps that correctly `try/catch` per-file parsing are killed \u2014 one\nmalicious upload can take down a shared server/worker.\n\n## Remediation\nAdd `await` on line 51 (makes the `RangeError` a catchable parse error), and validate\n`chunkHeader.size \u003e= ChunkHeader.len` before the skip (as the ASF fix did; also guards the loop\ncounter). Audit other parsers for un-awaited `tokenizer.ignore()`/`readToken()`.\n\n## Scope / honesty\nRequires the DSF path (a `DSD `-magic file \u2014 normal auto-detection). Relies on Node\u0027s default\nunhandled-rejection mode (`throw`, default since Node 15); the point is that the standard defensive\nper-parse `try/catch` does not protect against it. Crash (availability), not disclosure/RCE.\nNegatives confirmed alongside: ASF infinite loop fixed; negative-`ignore` infinite-loop class\nclosed at strtok3; unbounded allocation bounded by strtok3\u0027s read bound-check.\n\n## Credits\nIssue also reported by @ryu7eroo",
  "id": "GHSA-8j4c-6x6g-rq3j",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T19:40:45Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T19:40:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/security/advisories/GHSA-8j4c-6x6g-rq3j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/pull/2700"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/commit/e7fc27a96e789d41ece41fdac590fc7618274a41"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/releases/tag/v11.15.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "music-metadata: uncatchable process crash parsing a crafted `.dsf` (residual of GHSA-v6c2-xwv6-8xf7)"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.