GHSA-8GHH-482V-94QP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-23 21:30 – Updated: 2026-09-24 06:31A flaw was found in the automation-controller input-validation guard sanitize_jinja(). The function uses two regular expressions to reject user-supplied Jinja, but the patterns stop at the first interior '}' or '%' character, so a Jinja expression containing an inner brace (for example an empty dict) is accepted while remaining valid Jinja. Because sanitize_jinja() is the sole guard on several launch-time fields — ad-hoc command module_args, Machine-credential username / become_method / become_user, and inventory host names — a low-privileged user can inject Jinja that ansible-core evaluates in the execution environment. This enables execution of arbitrary commands in the execution environment (bypassing an administrator's AD_HOC_COMMANDS module allowlist) and disclosure of secrets belonging to credentials the attacker cannot read (by templating a co-attached credential's injected environment variables), across the credential access-control boundary.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-84714"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-184"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-23T20:17:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the automation-controller input-validation\n guard sanitize_jinja(). The function uses two regular\n expressions to reject user-supplied Jinja, but the patterns\n stop at the first interior \u0027}\u0027 or \u0027%\u0027 character, so a Jinja\n expression containing an inner brace (for example an empty\n dict) is accepted while remaining valid Jinja. Because\n sanitize_jinja() is the sole guard on several launch-time\n fields \u2014 ad-hoc command module_args, Machine-credential\n username / become_method / become_user, and inventory host\n names \u2014 a low-privileged user can inject Jinja that ansible-core\n evaluates in the execution environment. This enables execution\n of arbitrary commands in the execution environment (bypassing an\n administrator\u0027s AD_HOC_COMMANDS module allowlist) and disclosure\n of secrets belonging to credentials the attacker cannot read\n (by templating a co-attached credential\u0027s injected environment\n variables), across the credential access-control boundary.",
"id": "GHSA-8ghh-482v-94qp",
"modified": "2026-09-24T06:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-09-23T21:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71113"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71177"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:71179"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-84714"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2527198"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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