GHSA-8G8J-R87H-P36X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:50 – Updated: 2026-02-26 22:50Impact
Any user with read/write access to the backup storage location (e.g. an S3 bucket) can manipulate backup manifest files so that arbitrary code is later executed when that backup is restored. This can be used to provide that attacker with unintended/unauthorized access to the production deployment environment — allowing them to access information available in that environment as well as run any additional arbitrary commands there.
Patches
Fixes are expected to be released with versions v23.0.3 and v22.0.4 See fix commit at https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/commit/4c0173293907af9cb942a6683c465c3f1e9fdb5c
Workarounds
If maintainers intended to use an external decompressor then they can always specify that decompressor command in the --external-decompressor flag value for vttablet and vtbackup. That then overrides any value specified in the manifest file.
If maintainers did not intend to use an external decompressor, nor an internal one, then they can specify a value such as cat or tee in the --external-decompressor flag value for vttablet and vtbackup to ensure that a harmless command is always used.
References
Users can read more about the issue here: https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/issues/19459
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "vitess.io/vitess"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.23.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27965"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:50:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T02:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAny user with read/write access to the backup storage location (e.g. an S3 bucket) can manipulate backup manifest files so that arbitrary code is later executed when that backup is restored. This can be used to provide that attacker with unintended/unauthorized access to the production deployment environment \u2014 allowing them to access information available in that environment as well as run any additional arbitrary commands there.\n\n### Patches\nFixes are expected to be released with versions v23.0.3 and v22.0.4\nSee fix commit at https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/commit/4c0173293907af9cb942a6683c465c3f1e9fdb5c\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf maintainers *intended* to use an external decompressor then they can always specify that decompressor command in the `--external-decompressor` flag value for `vttablet` and `vtbackup`. That then overrides any value specified in the manifest file.\n\nIf maintainers did *not intend* to use an external decompressor, nor an internal one, then they can specify a value such as `cat` or `tee` in the `--external-decompressor` flag value for `vttablet` and `vtbackup` to ensure that a harmless command is always used. \n\n### References\n\nUsers can read more about the issue here: https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/issues/19459",
"id": "GHSA-8g8j-r87h-p36x",
"modified": "2026-02-26T22:50:37Z",
"published": "2026-02-26T22:50:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/security/advisories/GHSA-8g8j-r87h-p36x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27965"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/issues/19459"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/pull/19460"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vitessio/vitess/commit/4c0173293907af9cb942a6683c465c3f1e9fdb5c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vitessio/vitess"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vitess users with backup storage access can gain unauthorized access to production deployment environments"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.