GHSA-8G4H-8GRG-2529

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 00:30 – Updated: 2026-11-19 00:30
VLAI
Details

MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model's captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster's org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user's organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker's organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.

The vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.

The vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who can see the cluster via sharing-group rules, or a site administrator, and enforces a field allow-list that excludes org_id and orgc_id from update writes, preserving original ownership.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-132644"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T22:17:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "MISP contains an authorization flaw in the GalaxyCluster model\u0027s captureCluster() function, which handles the import and synchronization of Galaxy Clusters. Prior to the fix, any authenticated user holding the galaxy editor role could replace an existing locked Galaxy Cluster by supplying its UUID in an import request, regardless of which organization owned the cluster. The function unconditionally called captureOrganisationAndSG() before the save operation, overwriting the cluster\u0027s org_id and orgc_id fields with the importing user\u0027s organization, effectively transferring ownership of the cluster to the attacker\u0027s organization. Additionally, the save operation was not restricted to a specific set of fields, allowing arbitrary field modification.\n\nThe vulnerable behavior required the attacker to possess a valid MISP account with the perm_galaxy_editor role and to know or discover the UUID of a target cluster belonging to another organization. No site-admin or owner-organization privilege was enforced for the update path. The result was that a low-privilege galaxy editor in one organization could modify the content (value, description, distribution, etc.) of clusters owned by other organizations and seize ownership, corrupting the integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance.\n\nThe vulnerability was reported by ENISA and CERT.pl. The fix introduces an explicit authorization gate that restricts cluster updates to the owner organization, a sync user who can see the cluster via sharing-group rules, or a site administrator, and enforces a field allow-list that excludes org_id and orgc_id from update writes, preserving original ownership.",
  "id": "GHSA-8g4h-8grg-2529",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T00:30:34Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T00:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-132644"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}



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