GHSA-8F87-QJGG-4J6V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-14 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: Fix user array stride in pvr_set_uobj_array()
pvr_set_uobj_array() copies an array of kernel objects to a userspace array whose element size is described by out->stride. When out->stride is different from the kernel object size, the slow path advances the userspace pointer by the kernel object size and the kernel pointer by the userspace stride.
This reverses the intended layout. For larger userspace strides, later copies read from the wrong kernel addresses. For smaller userspace strides, later copies are written at the wrong userspace offsets. The padding clear is also done only for the first element instead of the padding area for each element.
Advance the userspace pointer by out->stride and the kernel pointer by obj_size, and clear per-element padding while the current userspace pointer is still available.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68262"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/imagination: Fix user array stride in pvr_set_uobj_array()\n\npvr_set_uobj_array() copies an array of kernel objects to a userspace\narray whose element size is described by out-\u003estride. When out-\u003estride\nis different from the kernel object size, the slow path advances the\nuserspace pointer by the kernel object size and the kernel pointer by the\nuserspace stride.\n\nThis reverses the intended layout. For larger userspace strides, later\ncopies read from the wrong kernel addresses. For smaller userspace\nstrides, later copies are written at the wrong userspace offsets. The\npadding clear is also done only for the first element instead of the\npadding area for each element.\n\nAdvance the userspace pointer by out-\u003estride and the kernel pointer by\nobj_size, and clear per-element padding while the current userspace\npointer is still available.",
"id": "GHSA-8f87-qjgg-4j6v",
"modified": "2026-08-14T00:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09beaf4aec05b0525f2153dce693f3eb3166697a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8dc8f3f4c2382fb7d1b1986ba8f33a2466cd3d7a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b983a35dad3701399c692d7c6eb57d8b6ffc0929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bbebc39a70f6fc9b02637c8624349e30325873cb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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