GHSA-8CF9-783R-H9XG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-28 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields
In check_synth_field(), when a synthetic event field is a stacktrace (field->is_stack) and the histogram field is not a "long[" stacktrace array, validation falls through to the generic size and signedness comparison.
Because parse_synth_field() sets a stacktrace field's type to "__data_loc unsigned long[]", its size is sizeof(u64) and synth_field_signed() marks it as signed. Consequently, any 8-byte signed scalar histogram field passes the fallback check, and its scalar value is subsequently dereferenced as a kernel stacktrace pointer in get_field_size() and trace_stack().
Furthermore, checking strstr(hist_field->type, "long[") is insufficient because tracepoint fields defined with __bitmask() or __rel_bitmask() also have type "__data_loc unsigned long[]" or "__rel_loc unsigned long[]", whilst create_hist_field() treats them as 4-byte scalar values without HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE.
Propagate HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE to variable references and field variables (whilst excluding variable aliases from per-element stacktrace capture), and reject any mismatch between HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE and field->is_stack in check_synth_field().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T11:17:36Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields\n\nIn check_synth_field(), when a synthetic event field is a stacktrace\n(field-\u003eis_stack) and the histogram field is not a \"long[\" stacktrace\narray, validation falls through to the generic size and signedness\ncomparison.\n\nBecause parse_synth_field() sets a stacktrace field\u0027s type to\n\"__data_loc unsigned long[]\", its size is sizeof(u64) and\nsynth_field_signed() marks it as signed. Consequently, any 8-byte\nsigned scalar histogram field passes the fallback check, and its scalar\nvalue is subsequently dereferenced as a kernel stacktrace pointer in\nget_field_size() and trace_stack().\n\nFurthermore, checking strstr(hist_field-\u003etype, \"long[\") is insufficient\nbecause tracepoint fields defined with __bitmask() or __rel_bitmask()\nalso have type \"__data_loc unsigned long[]\" or \"__rel_loc unsigned\nlong[]\", whilst create_hist_field() treats them as 4-byte scalar values\nwithout HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE.\n\nPropagate HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE to variable references and field\nvariables (whilst excluding variable aliases from per-element\nstacktrace capture), and reject any mismatch between\nHIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE and field-\u003eis_stack in check_synth_field().",
"id": "GHSA-8cf9-783r-h9xg",
"modified": "2026-10-28T12:31:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T12:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99163"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f36e4ddd05d540f363dbaa4c23042549f15b3ef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a244c241593b5b38a08f0df2cb43c26574efbdcb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/deb336ae7c7b341591a6862cf6fcfeca97c77dfd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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