GHSA-8CCV-3J8R-HX7F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-18 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-03 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

jfs: reject on-disk inodes of an unsupported type

Syzbot has reported the following BUG:

kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:668! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 139 Comm: jfsCommit Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-syzkaller-00085-g4e46774408d9 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:clear_inode+0x168/0x190 Code: 4c 89 f7 e8 ba fe e5 ff e9 61 ff ff ff 44 89 f1 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 7c c1 4c 89 f7 e8 90 ff e5 ff eb b7 0b e8 01 5d 7f ff 90 0f 0b e8 f9 5c 7f ff 90 0f 0b e8 f1 5c 7f RSP: 0018:ffffc900027dfae8 EFLAGS: 00010093 RAX: ffffffff82157a87 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888104d4b980 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc900027dfc90 R08: ffffffff82157977 R09: fffff520004fbf38 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520004fbf38 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff88811315bc00 R14: ffff88811315bda8 R15: ffff88811315bb80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888135f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005565222e0578 CR3: 0000000026ef0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? __die_body+0x5f/0xb0 ? die+0x9e/0xc0 ? do_trap+0x15a/0x3a0 ? clear_inode+0x168/0x190 ? do_error_trap+0x1dc/0x2c0 ? clear_inode+0x168/0x190 ? __pfx_do_error_trap+0x10/0x10 ? report_bug+0x3cd/0x500 ? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40 ? clear_inode+0x168/0x190 ? exc_invalid_op+0x38/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? clear_inode+0x57/0x190 ? clear_inode+0x167/0x190 ? clear_inode+0x168/0x190 ? clear_inode+0x167/0x190 jfs_evict_inode+0xb5/0x440 ? __pfx_jfs_evict_inode+0x10/0x10 evict+0x4ea/0x9b0 ? __pfx_evict+0x10/0x10 ? iput+0x713/0xa50 txUpdateMap+0x931/0xb10 ? __pfx_txUpdateMap+0x10/0x10 jfs_lazycommit+0x49a/0xb80 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x8f/0x140 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x99/0x150 ? __pfx_jfs_lazycommit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_default_wake_function+0x10/0x10 ? __kthread_parkme+0x169/0x1d0 ? __pfx_jfs_lazycommit+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2f2/0x390 ? __pfx_jfs_lazycommit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

This happens when 'clear_inode()' makes an attempt to finalize an underlying JFS inode of unknown type. According to JFS layout description from https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf, inode types from 5 to 15 are reserved for future extensions and should not be encountered on a valid filesystem. So add an extra check for valid inode type in 'copy_from_dinode()'.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-37925"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-18T07:15:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\njfs: reject on-disk inodes of an unsupported type\n\nSyzbot has reported the following BUG:\n\nkernel BUG at fs/inode.c:668!\nOops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI\nCPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 139 Comm: jfsCommit Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-syzkaller-00085-g4e46774408d9 #0\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:clear_inode+0x168/0x190\nCode: 4c 89 f7 e8 ba fe e5 ff e9 61 ff ff ff 44 89 f1 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 7c c1 4c 89 f7 e8 90 ff e5 ff eb b7\n 0b e8 01 5d 7f ff 90 0f 0b e8 f9 5c 7f ff 90 0f 0b e8 f1 5c 7f\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900027dfae8 EFLAGS: 00010093\nRAX: ffffffff82157a87 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffff888104d4b980\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000\nRBP: ffffc900027dfc90 R08: ffffffff82157977 R09: fffff520004fbf38\nR10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520004fbf38 R12: dffffc0000000000\nR13: ffff88811315bc00 R14: ffff88811315bda8 R15: ffff88811315bb80\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888135f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00005565222e0578 CR3: 0000000026ef0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? __die_body+0x5f/0xb0\n ? die+0x9e/0xc0\n ? do_trap+0x15a/0x3a0\n ? clear_inode+0x168/0x190\n ? do_error_trap+0x1dc/0x2c0\n ? clear_inode+0x168/0x190\n ? __pfx_do_error_trap+0x10/0x10\n ? report_bug+0x3cd/0x500\n ? handle_invalid_op+0x34/0x40\n ? clear_inode+0x168/0x190\n ? exc_invalid_op+0x38/0x50\n ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n ? clear_inode+0x57/0x190\n ? clear_inode+0x167/0x190\n ? clear_inode+0x168/0x190\n ? clear_inode+0x167/0x190\n jfs_evict_inode+0xb5/0x440\n ? __pfx_jfs_evict_inode+0x10/0x10\n evict+0x4ea/0x9b0\n ? __pfx_evict+0x10/0x10\n ? iput+0x713/0xa50\n txUpdateMap+0x931/0xb10\n ? __pfx_txUpdateMap+0x10/0x10\n jfs_lazycommit+0x49a/0xb80\n ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x8f/0x140\n ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x99/0x150\n ? __pfx_jfs_lazycommit+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_default_wake_function+0x10/0x10\n ? __kthread_parkme+0x169/0x1d0\n ? __pfx_jfs_lazycommit+0x10/0x10\n kthread+0x2f2/0x390\n ? __pfx_jfs_lazycommit+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nThis happens when \u0027clear_inode()\u0027 makes an attempt to finalize an underlying\nJFS inode of unknown type. According to JFS layout description from\nhttps://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf, inode types from 5 to\n15 are reserved for future extensions and should not be encountered on a valid\nfilesystem. So add an extra check for valid inode type in \u0027copy_from_dinode()\u0027.",
  "id": "GHSA-8ccv-3j8r-hx7f",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T18:31:15Z",
  "published": "2025-04-18T15:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37925"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28419a4f3a1eeee33472a1b3856ae62aaa5a649b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45fd8421081ec79e661e5f3ead2934fdbddb4287"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8987891c4653874d5e3f5d11f063912f4e0b58eb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c3f9a70d2d4dd6c640afe294b05c6a0a45434d9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afc08b0b5587b553799bc375957706936a3e0088"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa6ce4a9cc9fcc8150b80db6f65186c0ed2b3143"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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