GHSA-8C95-HPQ2-W46F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-03 19:19 – Updated: 2025-10-13 15:10
VLAI
Summary
NiceGUI has a Reflected XSS
Details

Summary

A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) risk exists in NiceGUI when developers render unescaped user input into the DOM using ui.html(). Before version 3.0, NiceGUI does not enforce HTML or JavaScript sanitization, so applications that directly combine components like ui.input() with ui.html() without escaping may allow attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user’s browser. Same holds for ui.chat_message with HTML content.

Applications that directly reflect user input via ui.html() (or ui.chat_message in HTML mode) are affected. This may lead to client-side code execution (e.g., session hijacking or phishing). Applications that do not pass untrusted input into ui.html() are not affected.

Details

NiceGUI allows developers to bind user input directly into the DOM using ui.html() or ui.chat_message(). However, the library does not enforce any HTML or JavaScript sanitization, which potentially creates a dangerous attack surface for developers unaware of this behavior.

The vulnerable code path appears when combining these:

ui.input("XSS Input:", on_change=inject)
def inject(e):
    ui.html(f'{e.value}')

In this setup, any input provided by the user is rendered verbatim into the page’s DOM via innerHTML, enabling injection of script-based payloads.

PoC (Proof of Concept)

  1. Create a simple app:

```python from nicegui import ui

@ui.page('/') def main(): def inject(e): ui.html(f'{e.value}') # vulnerable use

   ui.input("XSS Input:", on_change=inject)

ui.run() ```

  1. Run the app:

bash python app.py

  1. In the browser, input the following payload:

html <img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>

  1. Observe the JavaScript alert popup:

XSS

Impact

  • Vulnerability type: Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
  • Attack vector: User input rendered as raw HTML
  • Affected users: Any NiceGUI-based application using ui.html() or ui.chat_message() with HTML content from user input
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nicegui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53354"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-03T19:19:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-03T20:15:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) risk exists in NiceGUI when developers render unescaped user input into the DOM using `ui.html()`. Before version 3.0, NiceGUI does not enforce HTML or JavaScript sanitization, so applications that directly combine components like `ui.input()` with `ui.html()` without escaping may allow attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the user\u2019s browser. Same holds for `ui.chat_message` with HTML content.\n\nApplications that directly reflect user input via `ui.html()` (or `ui.chat_message` in HTML mode) are affected. This may lead to client-side code execution (e.g., session hijacking or phishing). Applications that do not pass untrusted input into ui.html() are not affected.\n\n### Details\n\nNiceGUI allows developers to bind user input directly into the DOM using `ui.html()` or `ui.chat_message()`. However, the library does not enforce any HTML or JavaScript sanitization, which potentially creates a dangerous attack surface for developers unaware of this behavior.\n\nThe vulnerable code path appears when combining these:\n\n```python\nui.input(\"XSS Input:\", on_change=inject)\ndef inject(e):\n    ui.html(f\u0027{e.value}\u0027)\n```\n\nIn this setup, any input provided by the user is rendered **verbatim** into the page\u2019s DOM via innerHTML, enabling injection of script-based payloads.\n\n### PoC (Proof of Concept)\n\n1. Create a simple app:\n\n   ```python\n   from nicegui import ui\n\n   @ui.page(\u0027/\u0027)\n   def main():\n       def inject(e):\n           ui.html(f\u0027{e.value}\u0027)  # vulnerable use\n\n       ui.input(\"XSS Input:\", on_change=inject)\n\n   ui.run()\n   ```\n\n2. Run the app:\n\n   ```bash\n   python app.py\n   ```\n\n3. In the browser, input the following payload:\n\n   ```html\n   \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(\u0027XSS\u0027)\u003e\n   ```\n\n4. Observe the JavaScript alert popup:\n\n   ```\n   XSS\n   ```\n\n### Impact\n\n* **Vulnerability type:** Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)\n* **Attack vector:** User input rendered as raw HTML\n* **Affected users:** Any NiceGUI-based application using `ui.html()` or `ui.chat_message()` with HTML content from user input",
  "id": "GHSA-8c95-hpq2-w46f",
  "modified": "2025-10-13T15:10:03Z",
  "published": "2025-10-03T19:19:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/security/advisories/GHSA-8c95-hpq2-w46f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53354"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui/commit/4673dc35c94a0c7339e2164378b0977332e60775"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zauberzeug/nicegui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "NiceGUI has a Reflected XSS"
}



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