GHSA-8C4Q-QFPH-FF23
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-10 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: airoha: Fix potential use-after-free in airoha_ppe_deinit()
airoha_ppe_deinit() replaces the NPU pointer with NULL via rcu_replace_pointer() but does not wait for existing RCU readers to exit before calling ppe_deinit() and airoha_npu_put(). This can cause a use-after-free if a reader in an RCU read-side critical section still holds a reference to the NPU when it is freed.
The init path (airoha_ppe_init) already calls synchronize_rcu() after rcu_assign_pointer(), but the deinit path introduced in commit 6abcf751bc08 ("net: airoha: Fix schedule while atomic in airoha_ppe_deinit()") omitted the matching barrier when switching from rcu_read_lock()/rcu_dereference() to rcu_replace_pointer().
Add synchronize_rcu() before ppe_deinit() to ensure all existing RCU readers have completed before the NPU resources are released.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68332"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:23Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: airoha: Fix potential use-after-free in airoha_ppe_deinit()\n\nairoha_ppe_deinit() replaces the NPU pointer with NULL via\nrcu_replace_pointer() but does not wait for existing RCU readers\nto exit before calling ppe_deinit() and airoha_npu_put(). This can\ncause a use-after-free if a reader in an RCU read-side critical\nsection still holds a reference to the NPU when it is freed.\n\nThe init path (airoha_ppe_init) already calls synchronize_rcu()\nafter rcu_assign_pointer(), but the deinit path introduced in\ncommit 6abcf751bc08 (\"net: airoha: Fix schedule while atomic in\nairoha_ppe_deinit()\") omitted the matching barrier when switching\nfrom rcu_read_lock()/rcu_dereference() to rcu_replace_pointer().\n\nAdd synchronize_rcu() before ppe_deinit() to ensure all existing\nRCU readers have completed before the NPU resources are released.",
"id": "GHSA-8c4q-qfph-ff23",
"modified": "2026-08-10T15:33:46Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2484568a335cd7bda951c75b3a7d95ea36161ae7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46e3bed4b071095ecc9384a7b349e1908728531f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad28c4f9e0eae4993cb3fde3e7cea330acd8b97c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.