GHSA-88XJ-3P4J-2C73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops
do_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that is as old as the caller's or older because a mount namespace that holds a mount of its own file, or of an ancestor's, would cause a cycle. But it only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC everything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are copied.
That's fine for a source in the caller's own mount namespace. Every mount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was bind-mounted. It isn't fine for a source in another mount namespace. may_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter what mount namespace it lives in so that /proc//ns/ and pidfds can be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces file descriptors the kernel will copy them irrespective of their ancestoral relationship to the mount namespace in question:
151 146 0:7 net:[4026531833] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw 152 151 0:7 mnt:[4026532293] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw
Mount 152 is a mount of the mount namespace file of mount namespace 4026532293 inside mount namespace 4026532293. That namespace and every mount in it are leaked... All it takes is a process in an older mount namespace that stacks the file and repeating it leaks without limit:
after control: Shmem: 380 kB child: mount(/proc/self/fd/6, MS_BIND|MS_REC): ok after cycle: Shmem: 65916 kB
do_move_mount() runs check_for_nsfs_mounts() over a detached tree for exactly that reason. Do the same for the copy before it is grafted.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98989"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:20Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnamespace: check a recursive bind mount for mount namespace loops\n\ndo_loopback() refuses to bind mount the file of a mount namespace that\nis as old as the caller\u0027s or older because a mount namespace that holds\na mount of its own file, or of an ancestor\u0027s, would cause a cycle. But\nit only checks the dentry the bind mount starts from. With MS_REC\neverything below it is copied and do_loopback() passes\nCL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE so mount namespace files below the source are\ncopied.\n\nThat\u0027s fine for a source in the caller\u0027s own mount namespace. Every\nmount namespace file in there passed the same check when it was\nbind-mounted. It isn\u0027t fine for a source in another mount namespace.\nmay_copy_tree() accepts a bind mount of any nsfs or pidfs file no matter\nwhat mount namespace it lives in so that /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/ns/\u003cns\u003e and pidfds\ncan be bind mounted. If we create a bind-mount stack of mount namespaces\nfile descriptors the kernel will copy them irrespective of their\nancestoral relationship to the mount namespace in question:\n\n 151 146 0:7 net:[4026531833] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw\n 152 151 0:7 mnt:[4026532293] /tmp/nrc/y rw - nsfs nsfs rw\n\nMount 152 is a mount of the mount namespace file of mount namespace\n4026532293 inside mount namespace 4026532293. That namespace and every\nmount in it are leaked... All it takes is a process in an older mount\nnamespace that stacks the file and repeating it leaks without limit:\n\n after control: Shmem: 380 kB\n child: mount(/proc/self/fd/6, MS_BIND|MS_REC): ok\n after cycle: Shmem: 65916 kB\n\ndo_move_mount() runs check_for_nsfs_mounts() over a detached tree for\nexactly that reason. Do the same for the copy before it is grafted.",
"id": "GHSA-88xj-3p4j-2c73",
"modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T15:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37a82f400efa4d263542a5fa41755b21057f1e5d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0ba48256f5dff6f75a45f8ce39fe57f21df1022"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c640a01a78e42302879006ed7b7d5a9a943ba815"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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