GHSA-886P-2CC6-VC45
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec
aa_vec_unique() null terminates at vec[n - dups] when VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE is passed. If the components are all distinct no duplicates are dropped, dups is 0 and the terminator goes to vec[n], so the caller has to provide room for n + 1 entries.
aa_label_strn_parse() sets up its vector with vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp) and then calls aa_vec_unique(vec, len, VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE), but vec_setup() does not reserve the terminator entry. Up to LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES it uses the local array of LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES pointers, above that it allocates exactly len pointers. The terminator therefore lands one entry past the end of the local array when len is LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES, and one entry past the end of the allocation when len is larger.
len comes from the number of "//&" separated components in the label name and label_count_strn_entries() does not bound it. An unprivileged task reaches the parse by writing to /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current or through lsm_set_self_attr(2), both of which go through do_setattr(), and the name is parsed before the change_profile permission is checked. The query_label() path behind the securityfs .access file, which is mode 0666, performs no permission check at all. Every component has to resolve to a loaded profile, so a system with policy loaded is required.
The other two VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE users work on a label vec that aa_label_alloc() has already sized with "+ 1 for null terminator entry on vec". Reserve the same entry in vec_setup() and DEFINE_VEC(). Passing len + 1 from the caller instead would move len == LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES out of the local array and into kzalloc().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89761"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:20:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\napparmor: fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec\n\naa_vec_unique() null terminates at vec[n - dups] when VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE\nis passed. If the components are all distinct no duplicates are dropped,\ndups is 0 and the terminator goes to vec[n], so the caller has to provide\nroom for n + 1 entries.\n\naa_label_strn_parse() sets up its vector with vec_setup(profile, vec, len,\ngfp) and then calls aa_vec_unique(vec, len, VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE), but\nvec_setup() does not reserve the terminator entry. Up to LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES\nit uses the local array of LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES pointers, above that it\nallocates exactly len pointers. The terminator therefore lands one entry\npast the end of the local array when len is LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES, and one\nentry past the end of the allocation when len is larger.\n\nlen comes from the number of \"//\u0026\" separated components in the label name\nand label_count_strn_entries() does not bound it. An unprivileged task\nreaches the parse by writing to /proc/self/attr/apparmor/current or through\nlsm_set_self_attr(2), both of which go through do_setattr(), and the name\nis parsed before the change_profile permission is checked.\nThe query_label() path behind the securityfs .access file, which is\nmode 0666, performs no permission check at all. Every component has to\nresolve to a loaded profile, so a system with policy loaded is required.\n\nThe other two VEC_FLAG_TERMINATE users work on a label vec that\naa_label_alloc() has already sized with \"+ 1 for null terminator entry on\nvec\". Reserve the same entry in vec_setup() and DEFINE_VEC(). Passing\nlen + 1 from the caller instead would move len == LOCAL_VEC_ENTRIES out of\nthe local array and into kzalloc().",
"id": "GHSA-886p-2cc6-vc45",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:26Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89761"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d4cb3af82556afc48f90fd3e8a126ff32343f41"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28069434aef66b9d084f0609b7a29c171846815e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36bdd0b45ec3f4822832a56e9db8674c8450dfce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40fdee1cb4f18e6a1a21a891ae4735bcd4d35026"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57bb24025f450728f342d8e08cd3909c89361d90"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9124e078ea2250d8d01d2162a550acb01ef5bf48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f1e40193eef7f047e6b77cfb4b4cafdecd7a123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b17c8f5dcb36a032688847b2bce4bd813b4baad1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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