GHSA-87FR-RH89-2WMG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove
rt700_sdw_remove() drains jack_detect_work and jack_btn_check_work only when rt700->hw_init is true. That state bit is cleared by rt700_update_status() when the SoundWire slave becomes UNATTACHED, but a jack work item can already have been queued by rt700_interrupt_callback() or rt700_jack_init() while the device was initialized.
Do not use hw_init as the remove-time guard for draining these work objects. The delayed works are initialized during rt700_init(), so remove can cancel them unconditionally and pair the object lifetime with the codec-private data lifetime instead of a mutable hardware state bit.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by manual review of the SoundWire status, interrupt and remove paths. The remove path should drain work based on whether the work object exists, not on a runtime hardware state bit that can change after the work was queued.
A QEMU PoC queued jack_detect_work, simulated SDW_SLAVE_UNATTACHED, and then entered remove. DEBUG_OBJECTS reported an active timer/work object associated with the rt700 jack work path after remove skipped the cancel.
This is sent as an RFC because the practical trigger depends on SoundWire core remove ordering after an UNATTACHED status update. If remove cannot run after hw_init has been cleared while jack work is still pending, this is a defensive lifecycle cleanup rather than a reachable race on current systems.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-93185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:18:14Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nASoC: rt700-sdw: always drain jack work on remove\n\nrt700_sdw_remove() drains jack_detect_work and jack_btn_check_work only\nwhen rt700-\u003ehw_init is true. That state bit is cleared by\nrt700_update_status() when the SoundWire slave becomes UNATTACHED, but a\njack work item can already have been queued by rt700_interrupt_callback()\nor rt700_jack_init() while the device was initialized.\n\nDo not use hw_init as the remove-time guard for draining these work\nobjects. The delayed works are initialized during rt700_init(), so remove\ncan cancel them unconditionally and pair the object lifetime with the\ncodec-private data lifetime instead of a mutable hardware state bit.\n\nThis issue was found by our static analysis tool and then confirmed by\nmanual review of the SoundWire status, interrupt and remove paths. The\nremove path should drain work based on whether the work object exists, not\non a runtime hardware state bit that can change after the work was queued.\n\nA QEMU PoC queued jack_detect_work, simulated SDW_SLAVE_UNATTACHED, and\nthen entered remove. DEBUG_OBJECTS reported an active timer/work object\nassociated with the rt700 jack work path after remove skipped the cancel.\n\nThis is sent as an RFC because the practical trigger depends on SoundWire\ncore remove ordering after an UNATTACHED status update. If remove cannot\nrun after hw_init has been cleared while jack work is still pending, this\nis a defensive lifecycle cleanup rather than a reachable race on current\nsystems.",
"id": "GHSA-87fr-rh89-2wmg",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:13Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-93185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bb23c9d68312e77cec81bdfb2cc385e2d2960f7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e8fddab6cbe536dd02e61205e4b9bf97df6479b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45fcf435ffcc5f61a43bd9b19094dc52de6cbc05"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/612ccf42acd14bb2685fa60c3495ca13e63e8989"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a47f087877bb2bc57c3ccb714fc49abf45d28e12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b81c2131dbb6fe04e27841bc719977c106177c61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1e21b7b977f5ae2955ecf3ab144da2578a4fe00"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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