GHSA-87F3-MHHQ-WFVX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-01 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-11 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: caiaq: fix stack out-of-bounds read in init_card

The loop creates a whitespace-stripped copy of the card shortname where len < sizeof(card->id) is used for the bounds check. Since sizeof(card->id) is 16 and the local id buffer is also 16 bytes, writing 16 non-space characters fills the entire buffer, overwriting the terminating nullbyte.

When this non-null-terminated string is later passed to snd_card_set_id() -> copy_valid_id_string(), the function scans forward with while (*nid && ...) and reads past the end of the stack buffer, reading the contents of the stack.

A USB device with a product name containing many non-ASCII, non-space characters (e.g. multibyte UTF-8) will reliably trigger this as follows:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in copy_valid_id_string sound/core/init.c:696 [inline] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_card_set_id_no_lock+0x698/0x74c sound/core/init.c:718

The off-by-one has been present since commit bafeee5b1f8d ("ALSA: snd_usb_caiaq: give better shortname") from June 2009 (v2.6.31-rc1), which first introduced this whitespace-stripping loop. The original code never accounted for the null terminator when bounding the copy.

Fix this by changing the loop bound to sizeof(card->id) - 1, ensuring at least one byte remains as the null terminator.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31778"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-01T15:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: caiaq: fix stack out-of-bounds read in init_card\n\nThe loop creates a whitespace-stripped copy of the card shortname\nwhere `len \u003c sizeof(card-\u003eid)` is used for the bounds check. Since\nsizeof(card-\u003eid) is 16 and the local id buffer is also 16 bytes,\nwriting 16 non-space characters fills the entire buffer,\noverwriting the terminating nullbyte.\n\nWhen this non-null-terminated string is later passed to\nsnd_card_set_id() -\u003e copy_valid_id_string(), the function scans\nforward with `while (*nid \u0026\u0026 ...)` and reads past the end of the\nstack buffer, reading the contents of the stack.\n\nA USB device with a product name containing many non-ASCII, non-space\ncharacters (e.g. multibyte UTF-8) will reliably trigger this as follows:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in copy_valid_id_string\n       sound/core/init.c:696 [inline]\n  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in snd_card_set_id_no_lock+0x698/0x74c\n       sound/core/init.c:718\n\nThe off-by-one has been present since commit bafeee5b1f8d (\"ALSA:\nsnd_usb_caiaq: give better shortname\") from June 2009 (v2.6.31-rc1),\nwhich first introduced this whitespace-stripping loop. The original\ncode never accounted for the null terminator when bounding the copy.\n\nFix this by changing the loop bound to `sizeof(card-\u003eid) - 1`,\nensuring at least one byte remains as the null terminator.",
  "id": "GHSA-87f3-mhhq-wfvx",
  "modified": "2026-05-11T18:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-05-01T15:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31778"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02d9c5b0b5553a391448b6d655262bd829f90234"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3178b62e2e31bab39f63d4c8e54bf4ee0a425627"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3afa2e67f3523a980a2f90fd63c22322ac2b9ce0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f7f8bae0d52cbd07ab04b76b6aac89ef98ee9f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45424e871abf2a152e247a9cff78359f18dd95c0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/66194c2575a4f567577ae70b1d7561163ce791a6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7594a6464873d90fd229e5b94cdd3b92c9feabed"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a82c1bce2d1299dd3c686a8fe48cf75b79a403c7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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