GHSA-872W-99M8-9923
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-18 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: xprtsock: annotate shared socket callbacks with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE
xprtsock replaces and restores sk->sk_data_ready and sk->sk_write_space on live sockets with plain stores, and xs_udp_do_set_buffer_size() invokes sk->sk_write_space via a plain load. These callback pointers are shared with generic socket and protocol paths that may read or invoke them concurrently, so xprtsock needs the same READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() callback visibility contract that the validated 4022 family applied elsewhere.
When SUNRPC takes over an AF_LOCAL, UDP, or TCP socket and later restores the lower-socket callbacks during teardown, another CPU may still hold an earlier callback snapshot. The plain replace/restore pattern leaves the same visibility hole as the validated 4022 family, so a stale snapshot can still invoke xs_data_ready() or xs_udp_write_space() after the live callback fields have already been restored to the lower-socket handlers.
Use WRITE_ONCE() for the shared sk_data_ready and sk_write_space stores in xs_local_finish_connecting(), xs_udp_finish_connecting(), xs_tcp_finish_connecting(), and xs_restore_old_callbacks(). Use READ_ONCE() for the direct sk_write_space invocation in xs_udp_do_set_buffer_size(). This matches the required callback visibility contract while leaving adjacent sk_state_change and sk_error_report handling unchanged.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90235"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:19Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsunrpc: xprtsock: annotate shared socket callbacks with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE\n\nxprtsock replaces and restores sk-\u003esk_data_ready and\nsk-\u003esk_write_space on live sockets with plain stores, and\nxs_udp_do_set_buffer_size() invokes sk-\u003esk_write_space via a plain\nload. These callback pointers are shared with generic socket and\nprotocol paths that may read or invoke them concurrently, so xprtsock\nneeds the same READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() callback visibility contract\nthat the validated 4022 family applied elsewhere.\n\nWhen SUNRPC takes over an AF_LOCAL, UDP, or TCP socket and later\nrestores the lower-socket callbacks during teardown, another CPU may\nstill hold an earlier callback snapshot. The plain replace/restore\npattern leaves the same visibility hole as the validated 4022 family,\nso a stale snapshot can still invoke xs_data_ready() or\nxs_udp_write_space() after the live callback fields have already been\nrestored to the lower-socket handlers.\n\nUse WRITE_ONCE() for the shared sk_data_ready and sk_write_space\nstores in xs_local_finish_connecting(), xs_udp_finish_connecting(),\nxs_tcp_finish_connecting(), and xs_restore_old_callbacks(). Use\nREAD_ONCE() for the direct sk_write_space invocation in\nxs_udp_do_set_buffer_size(). This matches the required callback\nvisibility contract while leaving adjacent sk_state_change and\nsk_error_report handling unchanged.",
"id": "GHSA-872w-99m8-9923",
"modified": "2026-09-18T18:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90235"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33930840b5f0a79f826e7c69dc6cd78f72a67481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/589f761236e05ff9de1bdfd6a5258f113e6457fe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8f0b83753809761a560c4b33249388548ba6e43"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da652cb17f9faeea1fa44b7215e8869a0b10b664"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed80d009b154aa204f541d390884851b3d4f15ae"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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