GHSA-86PX-9VHR-GG2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback
hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.
Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.
Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped; channel recovery is not attempted.
Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in hv_kvp_onchannelcallback().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64527"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:39Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback\n\nhyperv_receive_sub() reads msg-\u003evid_hdr.type and dispatches into one\nof four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host\nwrote into hv-\u003erecv_buf. The completion path then runs\nmemcpy(hv-\u003einit_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that\nwakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of\nresidue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.\n\nPass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that\ndoes not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on\nmsg-\u003evid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the\nthree completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE,\nSYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through\nto a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while\nSYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before\nreading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.\n\nSYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills\nresolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT\narray. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be\nread, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized\narray, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.\n\nOnly run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The\nmemcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE\nonly on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead\nreports the required length, which can exceed hv-\u003erecv_buf, so copying\nbytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the\nsuccess return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself\na malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped;\nchannel recovery is not attempted.\n\nRejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than\nsilently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in\nhv_kvp_onchannelcallback().",
"id": "GHSA-86px-9vhr-gg2j",
"modified": "2026-07-25T12:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-07-25T12:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64527"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/049a6b474823049fe60212f25f26e4b30f44ee8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/164dc7bf17609340233c6bf4f66bb7c7008a0511"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57d5d697642e05d5dd2d40660817765943dd709f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/588c84b461393ff1998ac7b97b04f953f642e0df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f87763f47a3c22fb50265a00619ef10f2394b18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8974d96b6a5496f33dc69a3ce28a7bf5078def4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5251226551bfec98c4705641b6f94ff1f238d91"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.