GHSA-86G8-833H-3HCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-12 15:31 – Updated: 2024-08-06 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_abort_trigger()
bdev->bd_super has been removed and commit 8887b94d9322 change the usage from bdev->bd_super to b_assoc_map->host->i_sb. Since ocfs2 hasn't set bh->b_assoc_map, it will trigger NULL pointer dereference when calling into ocfs2_abort_trigger().
Actually this was pointed out in history, see commit 74e364ad1b13. But I've made a mistake when reviewing commit 8887b94d9322 and then re-introduce this regression.
Since we cannot revive bdev in buffer head, so fix this issue by initializing all types of ocfs2 triggers when fill super, and then get the specific ocfs2 trigger from ocfs2_caching_info when access journal.
[joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com: v2] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240602112045.1112708-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-40951"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-12T13:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_abort_trigger()\n\nbdev-\u003ebd_super has been removed and commit 8887b94d9322 change the usage\nfrom bdev-\u003ebd_super to b_assoc_map-\u003ehost-\u003ei_sb. Since ocfs2 hasn\u0027t set\nbh-\u003eb_assoc_map, it will trigger NULL pointer dereference when calling\ninto ocfs2_abort_trigger().\n\nActually this was pointed out in history, see commit 74e364ad1b13. But\nI\u0027ve made a mistake when reviewing commit 8887b94d9322 and then\nre-introduce this regression.\n\nSince we cannot revive bdev in buffer head, so fix this issue by\ninitializing all types of ocfs2 triggers when fill super, and then get the\nspecific ocfs2 trigger from ocfs2_caching_info when access journal.\n\n[joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com: v2]\n Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240602112045.1112708-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com",
"id": "GHSA-86g8-833h-3hcm",
"modified": "2024-08-06T15:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-07-12T15:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40951"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67bcecd780609f471260a8c83fb0ae15f27734ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/685d03c3795378fca6a1b3d43581f7f1a3fc095f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb63357ef229fae061ce7ce2839d558681c42f1a"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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