GHSA-86FH-W43W-338C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-13 16:54 – Updated: 2026-07-13 16:54Description
The verification admin mutation flow allows accessing, verifying, and rejecting participants records from another tenant.
Technical description
The verification admin controllers loads pending_authorization_id with a raw Authorization.find(...) and then authorizes the record without checking whether it belongs to current_organization.
Reproduction steps:
- An org2 participant uploads their ID:
- An admin from another organisation, in this case org1, is able to open the ID from org2 by opening request 35, e.g
http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents/pending_authorizations/35/confirmations/new
- The admin then approves this request by looking up the ID in the picture (not shown in this image, but a real ID would expose this)
- Now the request has been approved, which can be seen from the org2 participant authorizations page:
Impact
A tenant admin can access, reject or approve another tenant's id_documents requests.
Patches
See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666
Workarounds
Disable the "Identity documents" verification
Reference
OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control
Credits
This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the Decidim Association and made by Radically Open Security against Decidim financed by NGI.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "decidim-verifications"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.30.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "decidim-verifications"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.31.0.rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.31.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "decidim-verifications"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.32.0.rc1"
},
{
"fixed": "0.32.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45330"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-13T16:54:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Description\n\nThe verification admin mutation flow allows accessing, verifying, and rejecting participants records from another tenant.\n\n## Technical description\n\nThe verification admin controllers loads pending_authorization_id with a raw `Authorization.find(...)` and then authorizes the record without checking whether it belongs to current_organization.\n\nReproduction steps:\n\n1. An org2 participant uploads their ID:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2184\" height=\"1288\" alt=\"decidim-verification-01\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6713454-c787-4795-b852-3c2c672358d6\" /\u003e\n\n2. An admin from another organisation, in this case org1, is able to open the ID from org2 by opening request 35, e.g `http://localhost:3001/admin/id_documents/pending_authorizations/35/confirmations/new`\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1539\" height=\"1037\" alt=\"decidim-verification-02\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6ed646de-a501-4964-8467-013ada55ce2d\" /\u003e\n\n3. The admin then approves this request by looking up the ID in the picture (not shown in this image, but a real ID would expose this)\n \n\u003cimg width=\"1542\" height=\"652\" alt=\"decidim-verification-03\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c7ee5bea-3fa2-43d9-8330-8d834f34a9af\" /\u003e\n\n4. Now the request has been approved, which can be seen from the org2 participant authorizations page:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2279\" height=\"720\" alt=\"decidim-verification-04\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55ee1bab-d396-4e0f-803f-21dc31a2c125\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nA tenant admin can access, reject or approve another tenant\u0027s `id_documents` requests.\n\n### Patches\n\nSee https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisable the \"Identity documents\" verification \n\n### Reference\n\nOWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the [Decidim Association](https://decidim.org) and made by [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) against Decidim financed by [NGI](https://ngi.eu/).",
"id": "GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c",
"modified": "2026-07-13T16:54:32Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T16:54:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/security/advisories/GHSA-86fh-w43w-338c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16666"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/decidim/decidim"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Decidim: Veri\ufb01cation admins can access supplied IDs from other organizations"
}
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