GHSA-869X-HW98-GF6F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-16 09:30 – Updated: 2026-10-16 09:30
VLAI
Details

The WP Compress – Instant Performance & Speed Optimization plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 7.25.00 The vulnerability exists because the start_comms dispatcher (wps_ic_comms::start_comms), hooked on every front-end request, gates access only by comparing the caller-supplied apikey parameter against the stored plugin API key with no WordPress capability check and no nonce verification, then passes the unvalidated group, setting, and value parameters directly to change_setting(), which writes them into the WPS_IC_SETTINGS option without an allow-list. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary permission keys into the plugin's settings, causing wps_ic_users::checkAndAddCaps() to grant any WordPress role — including Subscriber — the manage_wpc_settings capability and thereby achieve plugin-administrator-equivalent control over the plugin's optimization, CDN, and critical-CSS surfaces. The API key required to pass the authorization check can itself be obtained without authentication via the wpc_send_critical_remote nopriv AJAX action: when the external critical-CSS service returns an apiResults field, initCritical() echoes the stored plugin API key back to the caller in a wp_send_json_success response, completing the exploit chain entirely without a WordPress login.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-104755"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-16T07:17:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP Compress \u2013 Instant Performance \u0026 Speed Optimization plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 7.25.00 The vulnerability exists because the `start_comms` dispatcher (`wps_ic_comms::start_comms`), hooked on every front-end request, gates access only by comparing the caller-supplied `apikey` parameter against the stored plugin API key with no WordPress capability check and no nonce verification, then passes the unvalidated `group`, `setting`, and `value` parameters directly to `change_setting()`, which writes them into the `WPS_IC_SETTINGS` option without an allow-list. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to write arbitrary permission keys into the plugin\u0027s settings, causing `wps_ic_users::checkAndAddCaps()` to grant any WordPress role \u2014 including Subscriber \u2014 the `manage_wpc_settings` capability and thereby achieve plugin-administrator-equivalent control over the plugin\u0027s optimization, CDN, and critical-CSS surfaces. The API key required to pass the authorization check can itself be obtained without authentication via the `wpc_send_critical_remote` nopriv AJAX action: when the external critical-CSS service returns an `apiResults` field, `initCritical()` echoes the stored plugin API key back to the caller in a `wp_send_json_success` response, completing the exploit chain entirely without a WordPress login.",
  "id": "GHSA-869x-hw98-gf6f",
  "modified": "2026-10-16T09:30:26Z",
  "published": "2026-10-16T09:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104755"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/addons/criticalCss/criticalCss.php#L409"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/ajax.class.php#L816"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/comms.class.php#L1042"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/comms.class.php#L49"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-compress-image-optimizer/tags/7.10.03/classes/users.class.php#L30"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3734610%40wp-compress-image-optimizer%2Ftags%2F7.26.00\u0026old=3723132%40wp-compress-image-optimizer%2Ftags%2F7.25.00"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/67e9bfb8-b274-422a-a50d-a6b6b24bb193?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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