GHSA-865V-R97P-C9PQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-08 06:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/kexec: Push kjump return address even for non-kjump kexec
The version of purgatory code shipped by kexec-tools attempts to look above the top of its stack to find a return address for a kjump, even in a non-kjump kexec.
After the commit in Fixes: the word above the stack might not be there, leading to a fault (which is at least now caught by my exception-handling code in kexec).
That commit fixed things for the actual kjump path, but no longer "gratuitously" pushes the unused return address to the stack in the non-kjump path. Put that back in the non-kjump path, to prevent purgatory from crashing when trying to access it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53282"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T20:17:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/kexec: Push kjump return address even for non-kjump kexec\n\nThe version of purgatory code shipped by kexec-tools attempts to look above\nthe top of its stack to find a return address for a kjump, even in a non-kjump\nkexec.\n\nAfter the commit in Fixes: the word above the stack might not be there,\nleading to a fault (which is at least now caught by my exception-handling code\nin kexec).\n\nThat commit fixed things for the actual kjump path, but no longer\n\"gratuitously\" pushes the unused return address to the stack in the non-kjump\npath. Put that *back* in the non-kjump path, to prevent purgatory from\ncrashing when trying to access it.",
"id": "GHSA-865v-r97p-c9pq",
"modified": "2026-07-08T06:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T21:32:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/786a45757dcdf8f2beb9d4a6db605db16c18b2b4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dba9631faa2ee0785e8c2bf0e3d90a05f26dd8c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0bd7a850e1f082560959707dbf57b0402071646"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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