GHSA-85XW-CV8G-9227

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-28 09:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extents and using qgroups

There are a few exceptional cases where cloning an inline extent needs to copy the inline extent data into a page of the destination inode.

When this happens, we end up starting a transaction while having a dirty page for the destination inode and while having the range locked in the destination's inode iotree too. Because when reserving metadata space for a transaction we may need to flush existing delalloc in case there is not enough free space, we have a mechanism in place to prevent a deadlock, which was introduced in commit 3d45f221ce627d ("btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extent and low on free metadata space").

However when using qgroups, a transaction also reserves metadata qgroup space, which can also result in flushing delalloc in case there is not enough available space at the moment. When this happens we deadlock, since flushing delalloc requires locking the file range in the inode's iotree and the range was already locked at the very beginning of the clone operation, before attempting to start the transaction.

When this issue happens, stack traces like the following are reported:

[72747.556262] task:kworker/u81:9 state:D stack: 0 pid: 225 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [72747.556268] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1142) [72747.556271] Call Trace: [72747.556273] __schedule+0x296/0x760 [72747.556277] schedule+0x3c/0xa0 [72747.556279] io_schedule+0x12/0x40 [72747.556284] __lock_page+0x13c/0x280 [72747.556287] ? generic_file_readonly_mmap+0x70/0x70 [72747.556325] extent_write_cache_pages+0x22a/0x440 [btrfs] [72747.556331] ? __set_page_dirty_nobuffers+0xe7/0x160 [72747.556358] ? set_extent_buffer_dirty+0x5e/0x80 [btrfs] [72747.556362] ? update_group_capacity+0x25/0x210 [72747.556366] ? cpumask_next_and+0x1a/0x20 [72747.556391] extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs] [72747.556394] do_writepages+0x41/0xd0 [72747.556398] __writeback_single_inode+0x39/0x2a0 [72747.556403] writeback_sb_inodes+0x1ea/0x440 [72747.556407] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x5f/0xc0 [72747.556410] wb_writeback+0x235/0x2b0 [72747.556414] ? get_nr_inodes+0x35/0x50 [72747.556417] wb_workfn+0x354/0x490 [72747.556420] ? newidle_balance+0x2c5/0x3e0 [72747.556424] process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340 [72747.556426] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [72747.556429] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [72747.556432] kthread+0x116/0x130 [72747.556435] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [72747.556438] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

[72747.566958] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [72747.566961] Call Trace: [72747.566964] __schedule+0x296/0x760 [72747.566968] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [72747.566970] schedule+0x3c/0xa0 [72747.566995] wait_extent_bit.constprop.68+0x13b/0x1c0 [btrfs] [72747.566999] ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 [72747.567024] lock_extent_bits+0x37/0x90 [btrfs] [72747.567047] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x299/0x2c0 [btrfs] [72747.567051] ? find_get_pages_range_tag+0x2cd/0x380 [72747.567076] __extent_writepage+0x203/0x320 [btrfs] [72747.567102] extent_write_cache_pages+0x2bb/0x440 [btrfs] [72747.567106] ? update_load_avg+0x7e/0x5f0 [72747.567109] ? enqueue_entity+0xf4/0x6f0 [72747.567134] extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs] [72747.567137] ? enqueue_task_fair+0x93/0x6f0 [72747.567140] do_writepages+0x41/0xd0 [72747.567144] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc7/0x100 [72747.567167] btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x17/0x40 [btrfs] [72747.567195] btrfs_work_helper+0xc2/0x300 [btrfs] [72747.567200] process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340 [72747.567202] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [72747.567205] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [72747.567208] kthread+0x116/0x130 [72747.567211] ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 [72747.567214] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

[72747.569686] task:fsstress state:D stack:
---truncated---

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-46987"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-667"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-28T09:15:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extents and using qgroups\n\nThere are a few exceptional cases where cloning an inline extent needs to\ncopy the inline extent data into a page of the destination inode.\n\nWhen this happens, we end up starting a transaction while having a dirty\npage for the destination inode and while having the range locked in the\ndestination\u0027s inode iotree too. Because when reserving metadata space\nfor a transaction we may need to flush existing delalloc in case there is\nnot enough free space, we have a mechanism in place to prevent a deadlock,\nwhich was introduced in commit 3d45f221ce627d (\"btrfs: fix deadlock when\ncloning inline extent and low on free metadata space\").\n\nHowever when using qgroups, a transaction also reserves metadata qgroup\nspace, which can also result in flushing delalloc in case there is not\nenough available space at the moment. When this happens we deadlock, since\nflushing delalloc requires locking the file range in the inode\u0027s iotree\nand the range was already locked at the very beginning of the clone\noperation, before attempting to start the transaction.\n\nWhen this issue happens, stack traces like the following are reported:\n\n  [72747.556262] task:kworker/u81:9   state:D stack:    0 pid:  225 ppid:     2 flags:0x00004000\n  [72747.556268] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1142)\n  [72747.556271] Call Trace:\n  [72747.556273]  __schedule+0x296/0x760\n  [72747.556277]  schedule+0x3c/0xa0\n  [72747.556279]  io_schedule+0x12/0x40\n  [72747.556284]  __lock_page+0x13c/0x280\n  [72747.556287]  ? generic_file_readonly_mmap+0x70/0x70\n  [72747.556325]  extent_write_cache_pages+0x22a/0x440 [btrfs]\n  [72747.556331]  ? __set_page_dirty_nobuffers+0xe7/0x160\n  [72747.556358]  ? set_extent_buffer_dirty+0x5e/0x80 [btrfs]\n  [72747.556362]  ? update_group_capacity+0x25/0x210\n  [72747.556366]  ? cpumask_next_and+0x1a/0x20\n  [72747.556391]  extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]\n  [72747.556394]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0\n  [72747.556398]  __writeback_single_inode+0x39/0x2a0\n  [72747.556403]  writeback_sb_inodes+0x1ea/0x440\n  [72747.556407]  __writeback_inodes_wb+0x5f/0xc0\n  [72747.556410]  wb_writeback+0x235/0x2b0\n  [72747.556414]  ? get_nr_inodes+0x35/0x50\n  [72747.556417]  wb_workfn+0x354/0x490\n  [72747.556420]  ? newidle_balance+0x2c5/0x3e0\n  [72747.556424]  process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340\n  [72747.556426]  worker_thread+0x30/0x390\n  [72747.556429]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0\n  [72747.556432]  kthread+0x116/0x130\n  [72747.556435]  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80\n  [72747.556438]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\n\n  [72747.566958] Workqueue: btrfs-flush_delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]\n  [72747.566961] Call Trace:\n  [72747.566964]  __schedule+0x296/0x760\n  [72747.566968]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80\n  [72747.566970]  schedule+0x3c/0xa0\n  [72747.566995]  wait_extent_bit.constprop.68+0x13b/0x1c0 [btrfs]\n  [72747.566999]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80\n  [72747.567024]  lock_extent_bits+0x37/0x90 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567047]  btrfs_invalidatepage+0x299/0x2c0 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567051]  ? find_get_pages_range_tag+0x2cd/0x380\n  [72747.567076]  __extent_writepage+0x203/0x320 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567102]  extent_write_cache_pages+0x2bb/0x440 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567106]  ? update_load_avg+0x7e/0x5f0\n  [72747.567109]  ? enqueue_entity+0xf4/0x6f0\n  [72747.567134]  extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567137]  ? enqueue_task_fair+0x93/0x6f0\n  [72747.567140]  do_writepages+0x41/0xd0\n  [72747.567144]  __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc7/0x100\n  [72747.567167]  btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x17/0x40 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567195]  btrfs_work_helper+0xc2/0x300 [btrfs]\n  [72747.567200]  process_one_work+0x1aa/0x340\n  [72747.567202]  worker_thread+0x30/0x390\n  [72747.567205]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0\n  [72747.567208]  kthread+0x116/0x130\n  [72747.567211]  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80\n  [72747.567214]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30\n\n  [72747.569686] task:fsstress        state:D stack:    \n---truncated---",
  "id": "GHSA-85xw-cv8g-9227",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T18:31:13Z",
  "published": "2024-02-28T09:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46987"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96157707c0420e3d3edfe046f1cc797fee117ade"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d5347827d0b4b2250cbce6eccaa1c81dc78d8651"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8fbbd06fab9b75dcd68d850fe318ac3bc128974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9baa501b4fd6962257853d46ddffbc21f27e344"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.