GHSA-84MH-PVR2-7X86
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Cancel special fields on map value recycle
Map update and delete paths currently call bpf_obj_free_fields() when a value is being replaced or recycled. That makes field destruction depend on the context of the update/delete operation. For tracing programs this can include NMI context, where referenced kptr destructors, uptr unpinning, and graph root destruction are not generally safe.
Introduce bpf_obj_cancel_fields() for the reusable-value path. It only performs NMI-safe cleanup for timer, workqueue, and task_work fields. Fields that need full destruction are left attached to the recycled value and are destroyed by the final cleanup path instead.
Switch array and hashtab update/delete/recycle paths to this cancel helper. Keep bpf_obj_free_fields() for final map destruction and for bpf_mem_alloc destructors. Preallocated hashtabs do not have allocator destructors, so teardown continues to walk the normal and extra elements and fully destroy their fields.
This deliberately relaxes the eager-free semantics of map update/delete for special fields. Programs that relied on a recycled map slot becoming empty immediately after update/delete were relying on behavior that cannot be implemented safely from every BPF execution context without offloading arbitrary destructors.
There is a chance this change breaks programs making assumptions regarding the eager freeing of fields. If so, we can relax semantics to cancellation only when irqs_disabled() is true in the future. However, theoretically, map values that get reused eagerly already have weaker guarantees as parallel users can recreate freed fields before the new element becomes visible again.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74314"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Cancel special fields on map value recycle\n\nMap update and delete paths currently call bpf_obj_free_fields() when a\nvalue is being replaced or recycled. That makes field destruction depend\non the context of the update/delete operation. For tracing programs this\ncan include NMI context, where referenced kptr destructors, uptr\nunpinning, and graph root destruction are not generally safe.\n\nIntroduce bpf_obj_cancel_fields() for the reusable-value path. It only\nperforms NMI-safe cleanup for timer, workqueue, and task_work fields.\nFields that need full destruction are left attached to the recycled value\nand are destroyed by the final cleanup path instead.\n\nSwitch array and hashtab update/delete/recycle paths to this cancel\nhelper. Keep bpf_obj_free_fields() for final map destruction and for\nbpf_mem_alloc destructors. Preallocated hashtabs do not have allocator\ndestructors, so teardown continues to walk the normal and extra elements\nand fully destroy their fields.\n\nThis deliberately relaxes the eager-free semantics of map update/delete\nfor special fields. Programs that relied on a recycled map slot becoming\nempty immediately after update/delete were relying on behavior that\ncannot be implemented safely from every BPF execution context without\noffloading arbitrary destructors.\n\nThere is a chance this change breaks programs making assumptions\nregarding the eager freeing of fields. If so, we can relax semantics to\ncancellation only when irqs_disabled() is true in the future. However,\ntheoretically, map values that get reused eagerly already have weaker\nguarantees as parallel users can recreate freed fields before the new\nelement becomes visible again.",
"id": "GHSA-84mh-pvr2-7x86",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:37Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74314"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ea734e2cc0143d7429ab7dc0b20c85e5836183c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3a81d247651218e47153f2d2afd7aee236726fd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.